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1 Q. I represent to you that was the 
2 approximate month in which these two individuals filed 
3 their grievance. 
4 A. Okay. 
5 Q. ThatTs the point in time ITm looking at. 
6 Do you recall that? 
7 A. Okay. 
8 Q. I think there was another individual who 
9 was a pharmacist who also filed a grievance named 
10 Braithwaite. Do you recall him, James? 
11 A. He was a pharmacist? 
12 Q. Yes. 
13 A. Yes, I do recall. 
14 Q. In fact, there's only one pharmacist in 
15 the department, is there not? 
16 A. No. I believe there is one in Draper, and 
17 this one is in Gunnison part time, I belieye. I'm not 
18 sure about that. 
19 Q. In response to his grievance did the 
20 department provide for an administrative salary 
21 increase of four steps? 
22 A. I believe they did. 
23 MR. NOLAN: Excuse me. Before you 
24 answer that we'll object. Mr. Braithwaite was 
25 listed as a witness in documents with respect to 
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1 him supplied by grievants, and then I was advised 
2 by counsel last week that they did not intend to 
3 call him or refer to him in this matter. We 
4 object to any questions about Mr. Braithwaite, and 
5 any response would be hearsay in any event. 
6 MR. DYER: Your honor, if counsels 
7 understood I wasn't going to cross-examine, either 
8 I misspoke or he misunderstood. I didn't intend 
9 to call Mr. Braithwaite because Ms. Haymond was 
10 coming. If he misunderstood, I apologize. I 
11 wasn't trying to mislead him. I looked at my file 
12 and decided I didn't need him. To be candid with 
13 you, your Honor, I don't think it's hearsay 
14 because it's an admission against interest in 
15 terms of how the department treats various 
16 employees. 
17 JUDGE VALERGA: Well, in view that it 
18 may qualify as an exception under the hearsay 
19 rule, but hearsay is admissible anyway, so I will 
20 receive it. 
21 MR. DYER: Did you get her answer on 
22 the record? 
23 (Answer read by reporter.) 
24 Q. (BY MR. DYER) That was in response to my 
25 I question that he had requested a four-step increase 
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and the department granted that request, did it not? 
A. Right. 
Q. And if I'm not mistaken that occurred 
within the same time frame in 1998. 
A. I can't answer that for sure. 
Q. If I were to show you a document 
concerning his personnel history, would that refresh 
your recollection? 
A. Absolutely. 
MR. DYER: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
JUDGE VALERGA: Yes. 
MR. DYER: I'm not going to offer it. 
I'm just going to refresh. 
Q. Does that document refresh your 
recollection as to — 
A. Yes. It indicates he received an ASI in 
July of '98. 
JUDGE VALERGA: I'm sorry. I didn't 
hear that. 
THE WITNESS: He received an ASI in 
July of 1998. 
the 
Q. 
four 
A. 
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steps that 
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1 Q. The four steps that we've talked about 
2 here that he received. 
3 A. It appears from this document that he 
4 received seven steps. 
5 Q. Seven steps. Thank you. 
6 Ifd ask you to look at Exhibit G-9, just a 
7 quick moment. These are documents showing there was 
8 change in the salary range for these positions? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And in 1996 is when the IPC, the SS III 
11 and the correctional captain became the current salary 
12 range of 4 7 to 64; is that correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 MR. DYER: Your Honor, I move for 
15 admissions of Exhibit G-6, G-7 -- excuse me -- I 
16 forgot to offer 5 -- G-5, G-6, G-7, G-9, G-10 and 
17 11. 
18 JUDGE VALERGA: Any objection? 
19 MR. NOLAN: Same objection as before, 
20 Judge, with a couple of additional points. There 
21 is an argument as to relevance of anything that 
22 happened before the grievance, particularly with 
23 respect to the attachments to Mr. Dyer's letter to 
24 I be long, which should date back to 1990, ten years 
25 | before the date of the letter, and the question of 
1 Q. Okay. Let's back up for a minute. How 
2 long have you been employed with the Department of 
3 Corrections? 
4 A. September 4th of 1990 is my hire date. 
5 Q. And when you originally hired on, you 
6 hired on in what capacity? 
7 A. Purchasing agent. 
8 Q. Were you subsequently promoted to an 
9 accountant position? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And then from the accountant position what 
12 position did you get promoted into next? 
13 A. To an IPC. 
14 Q. IPC as we've designated it here? 
15 A. Yes, institutional program coordinator. 
16 Q. Is that in April of f92, then? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. That's when you believe you became a 
19 correctional captain; is that correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Since April of 1992 have you held a 
22 position of SS III? 
23 I A. Yes. 
24 J Q. And how did you come to hold the position 
25 I of an SS III? 
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have been transfers other than, if you will, the 
career mobility moves. Those are the transfers that 
have been actually implemented by the department. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the first page of Exhibit G-12, this 
reflects what you believe are the inequitable 
application of the salary ranges to your circumstances 
vis-a-vis Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And the figures we have listed here for 
June of '98, February of 2000 and April of 2001, to 
the best of your knowledge those are dollar figures 
that were obtained from the personnel records; is that 
correct? 
A. Yeah, they're current as of that date. 
Q. There were some pay raises that we've 
talked about here today that occurred in June of 2001 
that aren't on this document; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And it appears as we've looked at these 
documents you're comparing yourself to Mr. Carlson and 
Mr. Harr, 
individual 
A. 
Q. 
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of the fact that you have this inequitable application 
of salary range to your circumstances? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As I understand it, the relief you're 
seeking in this matter is a four-step salary increase 
retroactive to the date of your grievance. 
A. It is, sir, yes. 
Q. What is your educational background? 
A. I have a Bachelor of Science degree from 
Brigham Young University in business management. 
Q. Do you know if Mr. Carlson or Mr. Harr 
have an accountant's degree? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. When you were promoted to the position of 
IPC, to your knowledge did it have the same salary 
range in 1992 as the SS III and captain position? 
A. It did. 
Q. And has that been consistent throughout 
the time — 
A. Yes 
Q. — that you've held those positions? I'm 
sorry? 
A. Yes, it has. 
Q. Now, in this matter you also claim that 
you have additional relevant experience that goes to 
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1 your position as captain. Do you recall that? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Can you tell us briefly what that is? 
4 A. The time period between my hire date of 
5 September 1990 to the time that I was promoted to a 
6 captain would be looked at as what the Department of 
7 Corrections would look at as relative — 
8 Q. Relevant? 
9 A. Relevant. 
10 Q. Thank you. 
11 A, — experience. 
12 Q. What you're talking is relevant experience 
13 with the department. 
14 A. With the department. 
15 Q. As I understand it, you're claiming an 
16 additional eight months of additional relevant 
17 experience; is that correct? 
18 A. The time period I was a purchasing agent 
19 and accountant. 
20 Q. And prior to becoming an IPC. 
21 A. Right. 
22 MR. DYER: I have nothing further of 
23 this witness, your Honor. 
24 JUDGE VALERGA: Thank you. 
25 I Mr. Nolan. 
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just been told to replace a certain person in the 
department. You have one hour before your plane 
leaves for Hawaii. You spent all this money, and you 
can't get out of leaving, but you have one hour to 
take care of all the problems that reside in that 
basket, and you go through that, and then there was an 
interview process as well. 
Q. And as a result of that process did you 
have an understanding as to whether or not you became 
a captain? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you're talking about this process, is 
that the captain promotional process you've testified 
to? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. So is it your contention in this matter 
that as of June of 1993 you became a captain? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's consistent with the first page 
of Exhibit G-12 where you show a grade date of June 
'93, correct? 
A. Mine doesn't show '93. 
Q. The very first page. 
A. The very first. Okay. Yes. 
1 inequitable circumstance vis-a-vis you is Mr. Carlson, 
2 correct? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Do you have a college degree? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. I'm back to the typewritten page. Let's 
7 talk for a minute in terms of the positions you've 
8 held since 1993, because it appears you!ve been 
9 transferred rather frequently. 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. It shows on June 18, f94 that there's a 
12 transfer. Do you recall what that transfer was? 
13 A. Yes. It was actually a housing captain at 
14 that time. When I was promoted to captain, the 
15 working title at that time was internal security 
16 captain, and this one was a transfer to the housing 
17 captain. 
18 Q. And when you say a housing captain, tell 
19 us what that means. 
20 A. That means you're responsible for the 
21 daily activities of an inmate housing unit. 
22 Q. Would that be similar to being captain 
23 over the Elm unit? 
24 A. That's exactly the same. 
25 I Q. So as of June of 1994 you've held a 
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captain's position over a unit. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then in February of 1995 it appears 
that there's a career mobility, and you became hearing 
captain. 
A. 
Q. 
transfer. 
A. 
Yes. 
Then July of 1995 it appears there's a 
Do you recall what that was? 
I don't. 
Q. Does IDHO — 
A. I was the IDHO from February until March, 
I believe, of '97. 
Q. What does IDHO stand for? 
A. Inmate disciplinary hearing officer. 
Q. So when you were the hearing officer 
that's what 
A. 
Q-
recall what 
transfer? 
A. 
program coo 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
you were, was the IDHO. 
Yes. 
And after you became the IDHO, do you 
position you next held in terms of 
I was transferred to an institutional 
rdinator ." 
IPC? 
Yes. 
And that would be on April of 1997? 
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1 JUDGE VALERGA: Go ahead, Mr. Dyer. 
2 Q. (BY MR. DYER) As you recall, there was 
3 a meeting with Mr. Haun. 
4 A. Yes, there was. 
5 Q. Is that what you1re talking about, or are 
6 you talking about a separate discussion? 
7 A. No, it was a meeting with Mr. Haun. 
8 Q. And why don!t you describe for us what 
9 happened during the meeting with Mr. Haun. 
10 A. During the meeting he wanted to know our 
11 issues of the grievance that we had filed and why we 
12 felt like we had some action coming in that. During 
13 the course of the grievance we discussed other 
14 occurrences that we felt justified something to be 
15 done for us. Mr. Haun invited us to take this issue 
16 to court. It was his feeling -- that was projected to 
17 me anyway — it was his feeling that the legislature 
18 or whoever gives him his authority had given him the 
19 responsibility to do ASIs to maintain equity, but they 
2 0 did not give him the money to do that, and he was 
21 desirous of somebody taking it someplace where they 
22 would be forced to give that money. 
23 Q. So you understood Mr. Haun telling you to 
24 go ahead and appeal it because that way he would be 
25 forced to do it. 
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A. Yes 
Q. Now, all of the transfers that you've 
experienced as well as Mr. Burr, were those transfers, 
at least of your understanding, approved by the 
executive director of the department at any given 
point in time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Also, you've claimed in this matter 
additional relevant experience, and like Mr. Burr I 
assume that's the same time period, between your 
initial hire date and when you became a captain. Is 
that correct? 
A. Yes 
Q. And like Mr. Burr I assume you're of the 
same opinion based on the information you have, that 
the positions of captain, SS III and IPC are 
interchangeable with how the department has treated 
you. 
A. My personal experience, yes. 
Q. And the relief you seek here is a 
four-step increase effective as of May 1998. 
A. Yes. 
MR. DYER: I have no further 
questions, your Honor. 
JUDGE VALERGA: Mr. Nolan, any 
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Q. The reason I ask is because there are some 
very high numbers in these. For instance, the total 
UDC experience and also some very low numbers. You 
didn't do any sort of analysis in terms of whether or 
not the mode or mean would be different. 
A. No, 
Q. And as you compare Mr. Burr, for instance, 
with Mr. Carlson, your analysis on A-3 demonstrates 
that he has more experience with the department, 154 
months versus 140; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he has 8 9 months as a captain as 
opposed to 62 months with Mr. Carlson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he is four steps lower in grade, is he 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Lower in pay. I'm sorry. 
A. Wait a minute. Where are we here? Yes, 
four steps. 
Q. Earlier when counsel was talking with you, 
he asked you about what could make a" difference in 
pay, and some of the things you identified were salary 
freezes. As I looked at the summaries I didn't see 
anything suggesting other than this past year that 
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there were any salary freezes from 1990 to 2000 that 
would impact either Mr. Carlson or Mr. Burr. 
A. I don't know what years were salary 
freezes. That was just a general statement that they 
could affect a person's salary. 
Q. So you didn't do any analysis ta determine 
if that's the reason there was a difference. 
A. No. 
Q. As well as performance evaluations. Did 
you do any analysis to determine — 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Okay. And did you do any analysis to 
determine if promotions had affected the difference in 
pay between these individuals? 
A. The only thing I did as far as promotions 
was did they get the steps that they should have 
gotten under rule and policy for that promotion. 
Q. The reason I'm asking is -- if you would 
look at Exhibit G-12 with respect to Mr. Carlson on 
the typewritten page that you did. 
A. To Mr. Carlson? 
quick. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
As 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Now, I want to ask you a question real 
I was looking through the computer 
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1 screens -- how far back do the computer screens go? 
2 Do you know? 
3 A. I believe 1994 is when they converted. 
4 Q. Do you know when in 1994 by chance? 
5 A. I don't. 
6 Q. The reason I'm asking is because on 
7 Mr. Carlson's, if you look on March 29th of 1994, we 
8 have an entry there for a special adjustment — 
9 there's no clarification as to what it is -- of a 
10 dollar and 50 cents an hour that he apparently 
11 received while he was an SS III; is that correct? 
12 A. That's what it looks like. 
13 JUDGE VALERGA: Where is that line 
14 again, Mr. Dyer? 
15 MR. DYER: If you go, your Honor, to 
16 the G-12 and the typewritten page'for Mr. Carlson, 
17 March 29th, 1994, there is an entry for a special 
18 adjustment where Mr. Carlson's pay is raised 
19 $1.50 an hour without explanation. 
2 0 JUDGE VALERGA: Thank you. 
21 Q. (BY MR. DYER) Would you agree that over 
22 the course of time when someone receives a pay 
23 increase as a result of COLAs, moving up in merits 
24 when you have a pay increase, for instance this one 
25 of Mr. Carlson of $1.50, when you compare, they're 
192 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
this $1.50 special adjustment that Mr. Carlson 
received apparently caused him to now be making more 
money than both Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark. 
A. Apparently. 
Q. Now, your testimony was that in terms of 
the individuals being hired at different rates, in 
terms of different positions, was something that could 
make a difference, as I understand it, in terms of 
these individuals. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you actually do any analysis to 
determine whether or not it did make a difference? 
A. No. 
Q. Going back to A-3 for a moment, if I may. 
When you compare Mr. Clark's months as a captain on 
Exhibit A-3, he likewise has more months than 
Mr. Carlson, does he not? 
A. Yes 
Q. 122 versus 62? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this apparently results — as you look 
at the career path of these three individuals, would 
it be a fair statement to say that the pay differences 
between Mr. Burr, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Clark 
principally result from that special adjustment back 
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of A-2 somewhere there? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. The rule. 
4 A. No, I don't. 
5 Q. You don't. Then I'll share one with you. 
6 How is that? 
7 A. Okay. 
8 Q. If you look at 477-6-11, the second page, 
9 D, "The agency head or commissioner is the final 
10 authority" — 
11 JUDGE VALERGA: Just a minute. Read 
12 that slowly, Mr. Dyer. 
13 Q. (BY MR. DYER) "The agency head or 
14 commissioner is the final authority for salary 
15 actions authorized within these guidelines. The 
16 agency head or commissioner or designee shall answer 
17 any challenge of grievance resulting from an 
18 administrative salary increase." The way I 
19 understand these rules, 477-6, the previous one, and 
20 477-7 is that the department — or DHRM has now by 
21 rule given this issue in terms of salary 
22 compensation to agencies. Is that your 
23 understanding? 
24 A. I'd hate to interpret DHRM's rules for 
25 I them. 
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Q. You've been asked to do that this morning, 
so I'm asking you to do it now. 
A. As far as administrative salary increases, 
those are at the sole discretion of the executive 
director of each agency or commissioner. Is that the 
question? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Thank you. I agree. 
Q. And DHRM doesn't have any input on those. 
A. No. 
your Honor? 
MR. DYER: May I have just a moment, 
JUDGE VALERGA: Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. DYER) I just want to clarify 
with respect to G-5, which is your e-mail to Daryl 
Bell. Counsel asked you what your intent was with 
respect to that document, and you indicated that 
your intent was simply to give Mr. Bell information 
concerning salary ranges on his positions. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And use of the equal sign wasn't intending 
to suggest that there was a sort of equivalent between 
captains in any of these positions? 
A. Only in the salary range. 
Q. You don't have a copy of the — well, when 
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(Recess, 10:20 to 10:30 a.m.) 
JUDGE VALERGA: Mr. Nolan. 
MR. NOLAN: Thank you. 
KECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NOLAN: 
Q. Ms. Haymond, during the recess at
 ;my 
request did you get a chance to review the personnel 
file of William Carlson — 
A. Yes 
Q. — with respect to the issue raised by 
counsel about this item that is shown on G-12 that 
talks about a special adjustment in the salary? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And in your review of the file for the 
date shown on G-12 on the typewritten page listed for 
William Carlson, the entry "3/29/94 Special 
Adjustment," what did you find? 
A. It referred to his acting in a temporary 
capacity at a higher level, and he was awarded an 
increase for that. 
Q. And what significance does that have in 
your judgment? 
A. In my judgment it just shows one more 
instance that can affect a person's pay range or pay 
rate over a career. 
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Q. Because assuming some additional 
responsibility or other assignme 
management 
A. 
Q. 
presumably? 
Correct. 
Now, referring back 
Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark, insofar 
the path that their careers and 
with the department, and in your 
personnel files and based upon y 
experience with human resources 
Corrections, as of today are Mr. 
being paid commensurate with the 
department? 
A. 
Q. 
their rank 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Are they being paid 
as captains? 
Yes. 
Are they being paid 
their longevity with the State c 
Department 
A. 
interpose? 
objection. 
of Corrections? 
Yes. 
MR. DYER: Your Hone 
nt at the request 
to again in G-12, 
as this document s 
salaries have foil 
review of their 
rour training and 
in the Department 
Burr and Mr. Clar 
ir experience with 
commensurate with 
commensurate with 
)f Utah and the 
)r, may I 
I assume that this is subject to my 
JUDGE VALERGA: Yes. 
of 
hows 
owed 
of 
k 
the 
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1 MR. DYER: Thank you. 
2 Q. (BY MR. NOLAN) Are they being paid 
3 commensurate with the duties and responsibilities 
4 which each of them carries at the Gunnison prison? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 MR. NOLAN: I believe those are all 
7 the questions I have, Judge. 
8 JUDGE VALERGA: Thank you, Mr. Nolan. 
9 Mr. Dyer? 
10 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. DYER: 
12 Q. I just want to clarify your prior 
13 testimony where you talked about the special 
14 adjustment. Ifve looked at the remark on the HR 33. 
15 The total remarks are, quote, acting, close quote, in 
16 temporary capacity. It doesn't refer to temporary 
17 capacity as what, does it? 
18 A. No, it does not. 
19 Q. And if you look at the HR 33 on its face, 
20 there's no indication that there's any change in terms 
21 of this individual's position. 
22 A. It shows the food service manager too as I 
23 remember. 
24 Q. And, in fact, if you look at the action 
25 being taken, it identifies the $1.50 an hour — 
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May I approach your Honor? 
JUDGE VALERGA: Yes. 
Q. — it identifies the adjustment as an 
administrative salary adjustment, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. And when you were testifying earlier about 
what you had reviewed, this is the document that both 
you and I and Judge Valerga now are now looking at as 
the document you were referring to, correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. DYER: I don't know if your Honor 
wants a copy of that document or not. 
JUDGE VALERGA: No. I think the 
information from it has been explained in the 
record. 
Q. (BY MR. DYER) Have you ever received 
any publications while you were HR manager at the 
Department of Corrections regarding what equity 
issues are at the DHRM? 
A. No. 
Q. You've never received any kind of guidance 
in terms of this is what equity issues are for 
purposes of that rule in terms of publications or 
bulletins or anything of that nature? 
A. No. 
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director. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. You're aware that Mr. ALJ Smith Robinson 
4 had requested a declaratory order from Karen Okabe 
5 regarding the interpretation of HRM rules on ASIs and 
6 statutory interpretation? 
7 A. I am absolutely not aware of that. I 
8 certainly don!t recall it. 
9 Q. Okay. If I were to tell you that as a 
10 result of ALJ Robinson making that request of 
11 Ms. Okabe he was given instruction by yourself at the 
12 request of Mr. Haun to withdraw that declaratory 
13 request, do you recall that at all? 
14 A. I answered your previous question, I 
15 think, incorrectly, because I thought you said 
16 Mrs. Hobby. There!s a warden there, and I'm thinking 
17 Mrs. Hobby. So we're talking Karen Okabe. 
18 Q. Karen Okabe. 
19 A. In what year now? 
20 MR. DYER: May I approach, your Honor? 
21 JUDGE VALERGA: Yes. 
22 (Witness reviews document.) 
23 JUDGE VALERGA: Mr. Dyer, is that 
24 document the witness is reading an exhibit in this 
25 matter? 
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MR. DYER: It is not. 
JUDGE VALERGA: Do you intend to 
introduce it? 
MR. DYER: It is one that we would use 
as a rebuttal exhibit. We did not specifically 
identify it, and I suspect counsel is going to 
object because of that. 
MR. NOLAN: Yes. 
MR. DYER: That's why I'm using it to 
reflect his recollection. 
THE WITNESS: I do recall this. 
Q. (BY MR. DYER) In fact, Judge Robinson 
had requested a declaratory order regarding how 
Section 67-19-12 (3) (b) applies to individuals in pay 
equity circumstance. That's one of the requests he 
made. 
A. Yes 
Q. And he also requested a declaratory order 
regarding R477-7-119(c) (iii), how that applies as 
well, did he not? 
A. That's what the letter says. I don't know 
what it says, though. Maybe I do have it before me. 
Q. I'm just asking if he requested the — 
A. Yes. That's in the letter, yes. 
Q. And that's in October of '99. 
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A. Yes 
Q. And that's prior to — if you look at 
Exhibit A-l — do you have that handy there? I have 
one. 
MR. DYER: May I approach, your Honor? 
JUDGE VALERGA: Yes. 
Q. A-l is the final order that Mr. Haun 
issued. The date on that order is what, Mr. Chabries? 
A. I show July 18th, 2000. 
Q. And this communication between Judge . 
Robinson and Ms. Okabe is in October of '99, prior to 
the issuance of that final order; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then in December of 1999 Mr. Robinson 
withdrew that request because he received instruction 
personally from you, but it was an instruction from 
Mr. Haun; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. As a result, to your knowledge did 
Ms. Okabe ever give any formal opinions to either 
Judge Robinson, yourself or Mr. Haun regarding the 
interpretations of those statutes and rules that he 
had requested? 
A. My recall of this matter was this was an 
issue that needed to be handled by executive 
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1 directors, and a declaratory order, as director Haun 
2 stated to me, was not needed, that he would handle it. 
3 Q. Okay. Now, just taking a moment to look 
4 at Exhibit A-l. You don't have a copy of that, do 
5 you. I!m sorry. 
6 A. Is that the one you just gave me? 
7 Q. The final order. 
8 A. I do have the final order. 
9 Q. Okay. Exhibit A-l, as I look down at the 
10 bottom of the first page, Mr. Haun did some 
11 comparisons between Mr. Burr and Mr. Liston. Do you 
12 see that next to last paragraph? 
13 A. Beginning "Mr. Liston"? 
14 Q. Yes. 
15 A. I do see that, yes. 
16 Q. That!s the comparison that Mr. Haun made; 
17 is that correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. I don't see in this document any 
20 assessment from Mr. Haun that he had made a comparison 
21 between Mr. Burr and Mr. Carlson. Do you? 
22 A. It looks like Mr. Carlson1s situation was 
23 compared with Mr. Clark. 
2 4 Q. But not Mr. Burr. 
25 I A. I don't see that in this document. It's 
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Del Allred 7/25/90 156.2 42 $20.17 55 76% 56% 91% 
Russ Armstrong 11/28/83 235 75 20.72 56 114 101 93 
Cynthia Atkinson 8/13/84 226.5 83 21.29 57 110 111 96 
Dan Avis 6/22/81 265.2 109 21.29 57 128 146 96 
Larry Benzon 1/4/93 114 12 22.48 59 55 16 101 
Alfred Bigelow 1/20/87 198.5 52 20.17 55 96 70 91 
David Bradbury 7/18/85 215.4 125 21.88 58 104 168 99 
Steve Brough 9/18/88 177.4 91 21.29 57 86 122 96 
Ricky Brown 1/17/95 90 27.92 64-3 44 11 126 
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Melvin Coulter 4/07/86 206.8 21 20.72 56 100 28 93 
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Exhibit D 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
MELODY STAPLES, 
Grievant, 
v* 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND DECISION 
CaseNo.19CSRMLO.275 
The Step 5 hearing to determine the above-captioned matter was held on October 23 and 24 
and November 4,2002, in CSRB Conference Room 1116, State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt 
Lake City, Utah before Sherri R. Guyon, Career Service Review Board (CSRB) Hearing Officer. 
Melody Staples (Grievant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. The 
Utah Department of Health (DOH or Agency) was represented by Laurie L. Noda, Assistant Attorney 
General. Jennifer Bingham, Director of Office of Human Resource Management of Department of 
Health, was present as the Management Representative. A certified court reporter made a verbatim 
record of the proceedings. Witnesses were placed under oath. Testimony and documentary evidence 
were received into the record. The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code, 
§63-46b-2(l)(h)(2001)), now makes and enters the following: 
AUTHORITY 
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold this Step 5 hearing is 
found at Utah Code, §67-19a~406(2001) and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 et seq,(200l). 
ISSUES 
1. Was Grievant dismissed for just cause or for the good of the public service as provided 
in Utah Code §67-19-18? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Grievant was hired by the state of Utah on S eptcmber 1,1976, and was a child care license 
specialist with the DOH's Bureau of Licensing at the time of her dismissal on May 17,2001. 
2. Grievant is a career service employee with the state of Utah and qualifies to use these 
grievance and appeal procedures. Grievant consistently earned Successful overall ratings on her 
performance evaluations as well as Above Standard and Outstanding. (See Grievant Ex. 5.) 
3. In 1997, by legislative intent, the DOH was given the duty to enforce the rules and policies 
concerning child care licensing. The Agency conducted various training methods to inform 
employees of the proper protocols to follow. (See Agency Ex. 4, 7, and 8.) Grievant attended 
training meetings and presented a personal training log. (See Grievant Ex. 23.) 
a. On September 9,1997, a Southern Region Staff Meeting was held with Melody 
Staples in attendance. The minutes showed that there was a discussion on time frames for surveys. 
b. On March 9,1999 a Southern Region Staff Meeting was held with Melody Staples 
in attendance. Minutes showed that a discussion was held specifically on statements of 
findings. 
c. On May 17,1999, the minutes of the Southern Region Staff Meeting with Melody 
Staples in attendance, showed that a specific discussion was held on the importance of being 
specific in writing up deficiencies. 
d. On June 9,1999, a Bureau of Licensing Retreat agenda showed that a discussion 
was held about rules and protocols. 
e. On August 31,1999, a Bureau of Licensing Training Meeting was held wherein 
the agenda showed that child care workers had a session on monthly reports/variances, plan 
reviews and protocols for Hand Delivery ofNotices, and Sanctions/Conditions/Revocations. 
f. On October 27, 1999, A Southern Region Staff Meeting was held with Melody 
Staples in attendance, where the minutes showed that specific discussion was held on Class 
I and Class II deficiencies. 
g. On November 3, 1999, an agenda for a retreat meeting showed that child care 
workers had a session about the Technical Assistance Manual. 
h. On April 19, 2000, a meeting was held where the Operations Manual was 
discussed at a child care training meeting along with other training materials. (See Grievant 
Ex. 7.) 
i. On September 27, 2000, a Bureau of Licensing Training meeting was held in 
which a report from individual licensors was given with emphasis on new developments. 
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j . On February 13, 2001, a Southern/Dixie Region Staff Meeting was held, with 
Melody Staples in attendance, in which Class Fs were discussed. 
4. In December 1999 and 2000, the licensing specialists were instructed to do 100% 
self-audits of their case files and report problems to their supervisors as the holidays were a busy 
time to conduct inspections. Grievant said she spoke with her supervisor in December 2000 about 
follow-up times and was told there was some flexibility. 
5. In January 2001, an audit was conducted of all child care license specialists in the Bureau 
to provide for overall consistency, The 10% audit revealed that a number of Grievant's case files 
were substantially out of compliance with the Agency's policies regarding documentation, follow-up, 
and classification. Based on the findings of the audit, Bureau Director Debra Wynkoop ordered a 
100% audit of Grievant's case files. 
6. On February 20 and 21, 2001, an audit of Grievant's caseload was conducted by her, 
supervisor, Dave Eager, and her former supervisor, Joel Hoffman. (See Grievant Ex. 9.) The results 
showed that 55 of 64 files (86%) contained significant violations of Bureau policies or protocols in 
the following five major areas: 
1. 25 of 64 files contained Class I deficiencies. Of these 25 files, 
22 files (90%) did not follow Bureau Class I protocols . . . 
2. 14 of 64 files contained multiple follow-up inspections that did not 
follow Bureau protocols . . . 
3. 14 of 64 (22%) contained late (later than 75 days) follow-up 
inspections to annual surveys 
4. 4 files contained unapproved Bureau letters to providers.... 
5. Other problems: 
- 12 of 64 (19%) files contained inaccurate provider 
histories..,. 
- 15 of 64 (23%) files have unacceptable POC's [Plans of 
Correction] that were accepted and signed-off. 
- Poor complaint write-ups; not have enough information to 
support the decision to substantiate or not substantiate... • 
7. When Grievant testified about the specific violation problems in the audit of the case files, 
she said that she had exercised her discretion to judge the scope and severity of Class I and Class II 
violations and that there were various specific factors that entered into the issues of timeliness of 
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follow-up inspections, the letters, and the other problems pointed out in the case file audit. The 
factors included specific details about the provider, the age and number of children, and particular 
details about the facilities among other things. (See Grievant Ex. #10.) 
8. On February 20, 2001, Grievant was placed on administrative leave. 
9. On February 27,2001, there was a meeting with Grievant to review the audit findings. 
At the meeting were Jennifer Bingham, David Eager, and Debra Wynkoop (via telephone). During 
the meeting, Grievant said she was having difficulty enforcing the child care licensing rules because 
she believed that the providers weren't given enough training. After the meeting, Debra Wyncoop 
recommended that Grievant's employment with the DOH be terminated because Grievant knew the 
policies of the Agency regarding child care licensing but had failed to enforce them. 
10. On March 2,2001, Grievant prepared a written grievance of the Caseload Review which 
was sent to Mr. Eagar, Ms. Wynkoop, and Ms. Bingham. (See Grievant Ex. #4.) Among other 
things, Grievant stated that in response to the Caseload Review she thinks that the Operations 
Manual is incomplete in some of the areas she was cited for, that this was the first audit in 3 1/2 
years, and that she would need to see the specific files or know the specific providers to respond to 
specific problems. 
11. On March 2,2001, a Proposed Dismissal for Cause was sent to Grievant by Iona Thraen, 
Division Director, stating that she was being disciplined for serious violations of Bureau survey 
protocols. It also stated that Grievant had the opportunity to file a Step 4 appeal to the DOH's 
Executive Director, Rod Betit (See Grievant Ex. #L) 
12. On March 8,2001, Grievant wrote a written response to the proposed dismissal for cause 
to Rod Betit. (See Grievant Ex. #2.) Among other things, Grievant said that the Bureau had been 
in a state of transition with policy contradictions by the various supervisors and that she would like 
to be given the opportunity to correct some of the problems raised in the audit, 
13. On March 23,2001, Char Pehrson and Jennifer Bingham prepared a written Chronology 
of Events and Supporting Documentation for Proposed Dismissal of Melody Staples for Rod Betit 
(See Grievant Ex #3.) The memo emphasized that in regard to the Class I and Class II deficiencies, 
Class I deficiencies included exposed electrical outlets, water temperature hotter than 120 degrees, 
cleaning supplies and chemicals not locked, ratios out of compliance, etc. The issue of consistent 
discipline was also discussed. It stated that in October 2000, the Bureau had issued a proposed 
dismissal for cause for policy violations by an employee. It stated that the policy violations were not 
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as serious as the violations in Grievant5 s case files. It further stated that other disciplinary options 
were considered. 
14. Grievant presented examples of other disciplinary actions taken in the Agency for other 
unnamed employees in 2000 and 2001. These other actions included Corrective Action for 
Substandard Job Performance and a Two-Day Suspension without Pay for policy violation and a 
Two-Day Suspension without Pay for noncompliance with applicable policies and professional 
standards. (See Grievant Ex. #17.) 
15. On April 20,2001, Char Pehrson, then DOH Director of Human Resources, held a Step 4 
hearing with Grievant and her UPEA representative. After the hearing, Ms. Pehrson recommended 
termination of the Grievant to Dr. Richard Melton, then DOH Acting Director. 
16. Dr. Melton concurred with Ms. Pehrson5s recommendation. On May 17, 2001, the 
Department Decision was issued. (See Agency Ex. #1.) The termination was based upon 
Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rule R477-11 (l)(a) which allows for 
disciplinary action to be taken in cases of noncompliance with DHRM rules, agency or other 
applicable policies including but not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards and 
workplace policies. Specifically, Grievant was cited for having violated DOH's Rule R430-3 
governing inspection and enforcement of licensed child care facilities. 
17. On June 12,2001, Grievant timely filed with the CSRB her Request for Agency Action 
and/or, Alternatively, Appeal to Career Service Review Board from Final Agency Decision 
Terminating Grievant's Employment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A grievance filed in response to a dismissal is a disciplinary grievance. Since the Agency 
bears the burden of proof in disciplinary grievances, DOH bears the burden of proof in this case. 
Utah Code, §67-19a-406(2)(a). 
2. The evidentiary standard by which DOH must meet its burden of proof is "substantial 
evidence." Utah Code, §67-19a-406(2)(c). 
3. "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla of evidence," but less than "the 
weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is such quantum and type of "relevant evidence as 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Zissi v. State Tax 
Commission, 842P.2d 848, 853(Utah 1992); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 
(Utah CLApp. 1989). 
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4. DOH Policy R430-3 states: 
R430-3. General Child Care Facility Rules Inspection and Enforcement. 
R430-3-1. Legal Authority. 
This rule is adopted pursuant to Title 26, Chapter 39. 
R430-3-2. Purpose. 
This rule delineates the role and responsibility of the Department in the 
enforcement of rules pertaining to health and safety in all child care facilities 
regulated by Title 26, Chapter 39, These provisions provide criteria to ensure that 
sanctions are applied consistently and appropriately. 
5. DOH Policy R430-3-3. Statement of Findings states: 
(3) Violations shall be classified as Class I, Class II, and Class III violations. 
(a) "Class I Violation" means any violation of a statute or rule relating to the 
operation or maintenance of a child care facility which presents imminent danger 
to children in the facility, or which presents a clear hazard to the public health. 
(b) "Class II Violation" means any violation of a statute or rule relating to the 
operation or maintenance of a child care facility which has a direct or immediate 
relationship to the health, safety, or security of children in a child care facility. 
***** 
(5) The Statement of Findings shall include: 
(a) The statute or rule violated, 
(b) A description of the violation, 
(c) the facts which constitute the violation, and 
(d) the classification of the violation. 
6. DOII R430-3-4.Plan of Correction states: 
(2) Within ten working days of receipt of the Plan of Corrections, the Department 
shall make a determination as to the acceptability of the plan of correction. 
(3) If the Department rejects the Plan of Corrections, the Department shall notify 
the facility of the reasons for rejection and may request a revised Plan of Correction 
or issue a Notice of Agency Action directing a Plan of Correction and imposing a 
deadline for the correction. The facility shall submit a revised plan of correction 
within 14 days of receipt of a request 
7. DOH Policy R430-3-5, Corrective Action Required for Class I Violations states: 
(1) If the Department issues a Class I violation to a licensed or unlicensed child care 
facility, the facility shall abate or eliminate the situation, condition, or practice 
constituting the Class I violation within a fixed period or time for the correction that 
is specified in the Plan of Correction. 
(2) The Department shall conduct a follow-up inspection within 14 calendar days 
or within the agreed-upon correction period to determine correction of Class I 
violations. 
8. DOH Policy R430-3-6. Corrective Action Required for Class II Violations states: 
(1) A facility served with a Statement of Findings citing a Class II violation shall 
correct the violation within the time specified in the Plan of Correction or within a 
time approved by the Department, but not to exceed 60 days from the issue date. 
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(2) The facility shall submit justification to the Department for corrections that take 
longer than 60 days, for consideration of approval by the Department 
9. The Agency presented substantial evidence of policy violations on numerous Statements 
of Findings and Plans of Correction and Class One/Repeat Deficiency Statements by Grievant in the 
form of protocols not followed, incorrect classifications (along with correct classifications by 
Grievant to demonstrate knowledge of rules), incomplete documentation information, and follow-ups 
not completed in correct time frames. The specific rules violated included R430-50-10(l)(a)~first 
aid kit, (2)-fire extinguisher, (3)-safe outdoor play space, ^ -medicine, poison, dangerous objects, 
(8)-electrical outlets, (9)-hot water, and (12) firearms. Grievant's conduct of not following proper 
rules and protocols constituted a pattern of conduct of policy violations. 
10. DHRM Rule R477-11. Discipline states: 
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action. 
(1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following 
causes or reasons: 
(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, including 
but not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards and workplace 
policies; 
11. DHRM Rule R477-11-3(1) states: 
When deciding the specific type and severity of discipline, the agency head or 
representative may consider the following factors: 
(a) Consistent application of rules and standards 
(b) Prior knowledge of rales and standards 
(c) The severity of the infraction 
(d) The repeated nature of violations 
(e) Prior disciplinary/corrective actions 
(f) Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions 
(g) The employee's past work record 
(h) The effect on agency operations 
(i) The potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
12. The Agency presented substantial evidence of Grievant's noncompliance with Agency 
rules and policies. In compliance with R477-11-1, the Agency management decided upon the 
discipline of dismissal after considering alternatives. 
13. In compliance with R477-11-3(1), the Agency presented substantial evidence that the 
discipline was based on just cause and that it was not excessive, disproportionate or an abuse of 
agency discretion. 
DISCUSSION 
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At Step 5 of the grievance process, the hearing officer has the responsibility to determine 
whether the factual findings, as determined by substantial evidence, support the allegations made by 
the agency, and whether the agency has correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Utah 
Administrative Code, R137-l-21(3)(a), (2001). If the hearing officer determines that the factual 
findings support the allegations of the agency, then the hearing officer must determine, giving 
deference to the agency's decision, whether the agency's disciplinary action is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. Utah Administrative Code, 
R17-l-21(3)(b), (2001); Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 
933 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Application of the Factual Findings to the Allegations of the Agency 
Grievant argues that there was not substantial evidence of policy violations in this case. She 
contends that there is no evidence of children subject to imminent danger and no evidence of actual 
harm. She says that she exercised discretion in determining the classification of the types of 
problems she observed at the child care facilities in her inspections that were criticized in the audit 
of case files. She maintains that she had not received adequate training about Class I and Class II 
violations and that she had not been given an adequate opportunity to explain about the specific cases 
in her file which were the subject of the problems. In communications with her supervisors and 
management, Grievant explained that she had a difficult time enforcing the rules because she felt the 
providers had not received adequate training. Grievant also said that the bureau materials such as 
the Operations Manual were incomplete and did not provide adequate directions for all the 
enforcement activities. She explained that she was not consciously defying the rules and that in the 
past when she had been given the opportunity to make corrections to her case files she had done so. 
Grievant further argues that she felt this matter was a work performance issue and that she 
should have had the opportunity to be placed on a Corrective Action Plan to improve her 
performance of enforcing the child care licensing rules. She stated that she had revoked a license 
just prior to being placed on administrative leave and that she had been doing enforcing for 3 1/2 
years. She noted that she had been working for the State for more than twenty years with a 
successful work record. 
The Agency argues that this case is a noncompliance issue. Testimony at the hearing showed 
that enforcement activities in the position of child care license specialist could consist of both work 
performance elements and noncompliance elements, but that the issues in this case were 
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predominantly noncompliance issues. The enforcement of the rules was the core function of the 
position. The rules which were being enforced were the minimum standards set forth by legislative 
intent, The policy violations that were pointed out in the audit were very serious viol ations involving 
hot water, guns, household chemicals, etc. 
The audit showed violations of bureau policies or protocols in five areas- In the first area of 
Class I deficiencies, Grievant contends that she used her discretion to classify the violations 
according to scope and severity as Class I if there was "imminent danger" and Class II if there was 
a "direct and immediate" relationship to health and safety. The Agency explained that the specialists 
were trained to classify violations consistently and that Grievant5 s classifications were not consistent 
with the other specialists statewide. The specialists could point out problems to their supervisors 
who might exercise discretion in particular cases. The specialists were to use some reasonable 
judgment, but they were to follow the regulatory requirements used by all the specialists consistently 
throughout the bureau. 
The second area of violations concerned follow-up inspections. Agency rules and protocols 
were not followed in instances where follow-up inspections identified uncorrected deficiencies and 
those deficiencies were not reissued on site as repeat deficiencies. To allow for consistency and 
quality assurance bureau-wide, the license specialists were to follow consistent methods of reporting 
follow-up inspections. Proper documentation of the files is considered a very important aspect of 
the enforcement duties. 
The third area of violations concerned late follow-up inspections to annual surveys. Agency 
rules and policies provide for specific time frames to follow in reporting violations by providers. 
A number of files contained late (later than 75 days) follow-up inspections to annual surveys. The 
Agency provided examples of late follow-ups continuing to late 2000. Timeliness is an important 
part of bureau protocol inasmuch as the agency is charged with the responsibility to enforce rules 
dealing with the health and safety of children. All the license specialists had received training by 
the bureau to provide for consistency of application of the procedures yet the violations by Grievant 
were more severe than problems seen in other caseworkers' files throughout the bureau. 
The fourth area of violations concerned unapproved bureau letters to providers. Grievant 
maintained that these letters showed her effort to resolve problems with the providers, but the 
Agency maintained that these letters were not written according to approved bureau protocol 
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The fifth area of violations concerned other problems with specific items in the files such as 
inaccurate provider histories, unacceptable POCs, poor complaint write-ups, and incomplete written 
documentation without sufficient information to support a decision to substantiate or not 
substantiate. The Agency has the duty to enforce the rules about child care licensing. The licensing 
specialists need to be accurate and complete in their documentation of the files so that the Agency 
will have the requisite information to properly carry out its duty. Violations of the rules and policies 
by employees compromise the Agency's ability to fulfill its function. The Agency provided 
substantial evidence of numerous policy violations by Grievant. The allegation by the Agency of 
noncompliance with Agency policies and rules by the Grievant is supported by the evidence 
produced at the Step 5 hearing. 
Application of Rules and Standards to the Facts of the Case 
Having concluded that the allegations of the Agency are supported by the evidence and 
factual findings, the Hearing Officer must next consider whether the Agency properly applied the 
appropriate rules and standards to the case. 
The Agency has specific rules and protocol which govern the enforcement duties of the 
licensors who regulate the child care facilities in the State. The rules set forth procedures to follow 
and time frames to adhere to. The Agency has rules which carefully explain how to prepare 
Statements of Findings and Plans of Corrections. The rule requires four elements in the Statement 
of Findings as set forth in the rule above. The Agency provided numerous examples where Grievant 
had classified Class I violations as Class II violations. Grievant said she exercised discretion 
according to the circumstances to reach the classification decision according to scope and severity 
of the problem. Her rationale for her decisions is not acceptable or reasonable in light of the 
convincing testimony by several agency witnesses that the violations should have been classed as 
Class I violations based on the training the Agency had provided and based upon the classifications 
by the other license specialists in the bureau. The rules also require specific elements and time 
frames to be met in the Plan of Correction. The written forms require evidence of careful 
observation of the facility, of careful written documentation stating pertinent facts, and of attentive 
adherence to follow-up times. The Agency needs to have careful and complete documentation so 
that it can monitor the process effectively. The Agency is required to make a determination of the 
acceptability of the plan of correction and if it has incomplete information, it cannot effectively carry 
out the process. The Agency provided numerous examples where Grievant had not adequately filled 
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out all the information required on the forms, including missing signatures, untimely completion 
dates, missing dates, and inadequate factual explanations. Grievant explained that there were 
specific variables to take into account such as the specific type of facility, the presence or age of 
children, the situation of the provider and so forth. However, those factors did not alter the fact that 
many forms were seriously incomplete. The evidence showed a pattern of classification, 
documentation, and time-frame problems; the enforcement procedures were not completed according 
to Agency rules and procedure. 
Grievant argued that the Agency should have followed the provisions it has to place the 
Grievant on Corrective Action so that she could have improved her work performance. The Agency 
does have policies that allow for employees to be placed on cprrective action, but the Agency 
determined that this case is a noncompliance case based on the severity and number of policy 
violations committed by the Grievant and applied the disciplinary provisions contained in the rules 
that apply to noncompliance. The Agency is charged with the duty to enforce the child care licensing 
rules throughout the State, It has established rules for its employees to follow to carry out the duties. 
It has provided training for the employees and various manuals and guidelines. The Agency can 
reasonably expect that the employees will learn the information presented in training and will also 
apply self-study to learn and understand the rules pertaining to their positions. The Agency is using 
the resources of the State to conduct training and can reasonably expect that the employees will have 
a reasonable and prudent respect for the importance of the rules and will carefully carry them out so 
that overall the resources of the State are judiciously used. The Agency appropriately applied 
disciplinary rules to this case of Grievant's noncompliance with Agency rules. 
Analysis of Agency Discretion with Respect to the Facts of the Case 
The final issue to be considered in this case is whether the sanction administered by the 
Agency is so excessive or disproportionate, or otherwise so egregious as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. R137-l-21(3)(b), Utah Administrative Code (2001). 
Grievant contends that she should have been given the opportunity to improve in her 
enforcement duties because in the past when she had been given an opportunity to correct problems 
she had done so successfully. The Agency contended that Grievant's efforts to improve in the past 
could have been more sincere and that her policy violations were more severe than the problems of 
other licensors in the bureau. Grievant presented examples of lesser sanctions given to other 
employees in the Agency in 2000 and 2001. The examples did not appear to present the same types 
Staples v. Health, 19 CSRB/H.0.275 Page 11 
or severity of violations as the Grievant's violations were. The Agency presented an example of 
consistent discipline in the form of a comparison with an employee who was issued a proposed 
dismissal for cause in October 2000 for policy violations based on a case file review. 
The exercise of Agency discretion in the imposition of sanctions is provided for in DHRM 
rules as stated above. The rules provide guidance for determining the appropriateness of sanctions 
including such factors as consistent application of rules and standards, prior knowledge of rules and 
standards, the severity of the infraction, the repeated nature of the violations, and the effect on 
agency operations. Agency witnesses provided evidence that they had considered various factors 
and alternatives in reaching their decision about what discipline to impose on Grievant. 
The evidence showed severe and numerous policy violations by Grievant in five important 
areas of enforcement duties. The Agency had been involved in enforcement duties for 3 1/2 years 
under new mandates, but the audit revealed serious violations by Grievant to a degree not seen in 
other license specialists throughout the State. Grievant explained that she was exercising discretion, 
but more sound decision-making could be expected by a long-term employee of the State. The 
Agency exercised its discretion to determine the sanction of dismissal for just cause based on 
Grievant's noncompliance with Agency rules and policies. Substantial evidence was not presented 
to show that the Agency inconsistently applied its rules and policies to Grievant. Based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the Agency's decision to dismiss Grievant is reasonable and is not 
arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
DECISION 
For the foregoing reasons, the grievance filed herein is respectfully denied and the 
disciplinary action of dismissal is upheld. 
DATED this 25th day of November 2002. 
Sherri R. Guyon 
Hearing/Presiding Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within 
ten working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code S67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
rvJ' 
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CRAIG BURR and LOWELL H. CLARK, 
Grievants and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency and Respondent. 
DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
THE STEP 6 DECISION 
AND FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
DATED DECEMBER 22,2003 
CaseNos. 7 CSRB 69 (Step 6) 
18 CSRB/H.0.259 (Step 5) 
On Monday, January 12, 2004, the Career Service Review Board (Board) received 
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action Dated 
December 22, 2003. After carefully reviewing and considering Appellants' motion, the legal 
arguments raised therein, and its Decision and Final Agency Action (Decision), the Board hereby 
denies their request for reconsideration and upholds its December 22,2003 Decision. 
DATED this 27th day of January 2004. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Blake S. Atkin, Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J. McGowan, Member 
Blake S. Atkin, Chair 
Career Service Review Board 
Vr 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 • Voice 538-3048 • Fax 538-3139 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
CRAIG BURR and LOWELL EL CLARK, 
Grievants and Appellants, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency and Respondent. 
DECISION 
AND 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
CaseNos. 7 CSRB 69 (Step 6) 
18 CSRB/H.O.259 (Step 5) 
On Thursday, October 23, 2003, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an 
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair, Felix J. McGowan, 
Joan M. Gallegos, and Dale L. Whittle. Messrs. Craig Burr and Lowell H. Clark 
(Grievants/Appellants) were present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, who 
presented oral argument on Appellants' behalf. Carey A. Seager, Attorney at Law, was also present 
and assisted Mr. Dyer at Counsel's table. Assistant Attorney Patrick B. Nolan, represented the 
Department of Corrections (Department and DOC) with Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager, 
present as the Department's management representative. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code Annotated at §§ 67-19a-101 
through -408 (Supp. 1998) (hereinafter Utah Code) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at 
§§ 67-19 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the Utah Administrative Code at 
R137-1-1 through -23 {Supp, 1998). This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final 
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Messrs. Burr 
and Clark's appeal of the denial of their salary grievance. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and 
these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-1-
1 &(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining 
to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. (§§ 63-46b et seq.) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about May 28,1998, Appellants "submitted a 'pay inequity' grievance alleging that 
the Department of Corrections (the agency) had inequitably applied the Captain's salary range' 
between Appellants and others employed by the Department in the same position. (Appellants' Brief 
on Appeal at 2). The remedy or relief sought by Appellants was to have their salary increased by 
four steps. (Utah Department of Corrections Staff Grievance, May 28, 1998).{ 
On May 28, 1998, the Career Service Review Board's Administrator consolidated the 
Appellants' grievances pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-17. The Department's final order or Step 4 
decision was issued on July 18,2000. (Agency Ex. 1), 
In making his Final Decision, former Executive Director H.L. "Pete" Haun reviewed the 
salary histories of Appellants and others holding the same position as Appellants. After conducting 
his review, Executive Director Haun determined that Appellants had received all "the increases to 
which they were entitled." (Id.) Moreover, Executive Director Haun determined that administrative 
salary increases were discretionary and that the favorable exercise of discretion at one point of an 
employee's career does not entitle others to receive administrative salary increases when the 
employees' career paths merge. (Id) 
After considering all these factors, Executive Director Haun concluded that "discretion to 
grant administrative salary increases is found in the currentrule, R477-7-3(l 1) . . . The increase must 
be justified . . . In these circumstances I do not see how the increases Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark seek 
can be justified. Therefore, I deny their grievances " (Id) 
Thereafter, on or about August 11, 2000, Appellants timely filed their appeal of Executive 
Director Pete Harm's Final Decision with the CSRB* 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING 
On Wednesday, August 14, and Thursday, August 15,2003, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was 
held before CSRB Hearing J. Francis Valerga (Hearing Officer). At the nearing, Appellants were 
represented by Phillip W- Dyer, Attorney at Law. The Department was represented by 
Patrick B. Nolan, Assistant Attorney General. Assisting Mr. Nolan, was the Department's 
management representative, David Salazar, the Human Resource Director for the Department. 
^hese grievances are part of the file maintained by the CSRB. 
Burr & Clark v Corrections, 7 CSRB 69 Page 2 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code, 
§ 67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellants are challenging the Department's denial of their 
grievance relating to salary or wages, Grievants have the burden of proving their case by substantial 
evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code, § 67-19a-406(2)(b) and- (p)) The specific 
issues adjudicated at the Appellants5 Step 5 hearing were twofold. First, were Grievants entitled to 
prevail on their salary or wage grievance? If so, what was the appropriate remedy? (Prehearing 
Conference Summary and Order, at 2, *f 6; Notice of Rescheduled Administrative Hearing, May 2, 
2002; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order, at 1) 
On or about May 1,2001, prior to the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Department filed 
two separate motions in this case. The first was a Motion to Dismiss along with an accompanying 
Memorandum in Support asking that the Appellants' grievance be dismissed for failure to allege a 
specific 'Violation of a law or rule." The second was a Motion for Order in Limine requesting an 
order to exclude "any evidence or testimony relating to salary comparison of persons not classified 
as 'captain' within the Utah Department of Corrections," On July 2, 2001, the Hearing Officer 
entered a joint order denying both the Department's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Order in 
Limine. 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter^ the hearing officer received evidence relating to 
Appellants5 salary grievance. Specifically, there was testimony given and documentary evidence 
received concerning the Appellants' salary, both at the time of the filing of their grievance2 and at 
the time of the hearing, in relation to other departmental employees employed in the same job 
classification as Appellants and performing the same or similar work.3 
In addition, testimony was heard and evidence received concerning the granting of 
2
 Both Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark filed their original grievance in May 1998. These grievances are 
essentially identical, both in the statement of the problem and the relief requested. Based upon these facts, 
the then CSRB Administrator consolidated the grievances in accordance with CSRB rule R137-1-17. This 
consolidation was done pursuant to separate letters to Messrs. Burr and Clark dated May 28, 1998. 
3
 Appellants' case focuses primarily on two specific employees employed by the Department in the 
same job classification as Appellants, doing the same or similar work as Appellants, but being paid more. 
However, evidence was clearly received regarding other employees employed by the Department in the same 
job classification as Appellants' and performing the same or similar work. The two employees with whom 
Appellants compared themselves are William Carlson and Randall Keven Harr. At the time of the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing, the undisputed facts establish that Appellants Burr and Claik were making $21.88 and 
$21.29 respectively. (Exhibit G2. G12; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order at 5 n3) 
At the time of the hearing, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr were making $24.38 and over $25.00 respectively. (Id.) 
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administrative salary increases (ASI) under Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) 
rule R477-7-4-(l l).4 Specifically, evidence was received and considered as to whether the 
Department's Executive Director' s decision to deny Appellants an ASI was an arbitrary or otherwise 
an abuse of discretion.5 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 Decision) dated December 13, 2002. In reaching this 
Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer clearly examined the evidence presented at the evidentiary 
hearing and carefully considered the legal arguments presented by the parties both at the hearing and 
in their post-trial briefs.6 After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing and examining the 
relevant statutes, the Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 Decision denying Appellants5 grievance and 
upholding the Department's Final Order dated July 18,2000. (Step 5 Decision at 12) In reaching his 
Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer essentially concluded that the Department had not violated 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), (b) or 6749-3.L The Hearing Officer also concluded that the 
denial of the ASFs sought by Appellants was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion and 
constituted a discretionary internal personnel matter exempt from review by the CSRB. {Id. at 5,11) 
B, ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In the Appellants' appeal before this Board, they challenge numerous aspects of the Hearing 
Officer's Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in legally 
concluding that Appellants had received all the salary increases to which they were entitled by law 
and that the specific statutory provisions relied upon by Appellants in support of their salary 
grievance applied to salary ranges, not to individual salaries. (Appellants5 Brief on Appeal at 4-5, 
16-18) 
4The Board notes that the DHRM rule existing at the time Appellants filed their grievance has been 
modified and that the existing rule received into evidence as Exhibit A2 omits "equity issues" as a reason 
supporting the granting of an ASI. The Hearing Officer did however, with the approval of the parties, hand 
write into Exhibit A2 the words "equity issues" which accurately reflects the wording of the rule at the time 
Appellants filed their grievance (TrU at 156-159). 
5At the time Appellants filed their grievance, HJL. "Pete" Haun was the executive director of the 
Department- Mr. Haun issued his Final Order on July 18, 2000, denying Appellants' grievance at the 
departmental level. This Final Order was timely appealed to the CSRB on August 11, 2000. 
5Review of the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision establishes numerous references to the case law 
cited by both parties in their post-trial briefs and specifically quotes from pages 14-15 of the Appellants' 
post-trial brief. 
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Tn addition, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Department's 
Executive Director's decision to deny Appellants3 grievance and not grant the four-step ASI 
Appellants requested was arbitrary or otherwise an abuse of discretion. Appellants also challenge 
the Hearing Officer's finding that the Department's decision to not grant an ASI to Appellants was 
an internal, discretionary personnel action and therefore exempt from review by the CSRB and the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(2). 
Appellants also assert that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the responsibility for 
enforcing and carrying out the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3 )(a), (b) and 67-19-3.1 
is the responsibility of DHRM. Appellants assert that their rights are independent of whether DHRM 
or the Department is responsible for implementing these statutes and that any failure on the part of 
DHRM does not excuse the Department from complying with these provisions. (Appellants' Brief 
on Appeal at 4, 21) 
Finally, in their Brief on Appeal, Appellants challenge two factual findings of the Hearing 
Officer. These challenges focus primarily on the Hearing Officer's findings concerning the work 
duties and responsibilities of the Correctional Institution Program Coordinator, Correctional Support 
Services Supervisor III and the Correctional Captain7 and Appellants' assertion that no specific 
reasons were identified for the differences in pay between Appellants and Messrs. Carlson and Harr 
specifically. 
In essence, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision that the disparity in 
salary between Appellants and other Department employees performing the same or similar duties 
as Appellants and in their same job classification does not violate the provisions of the USPMA, 
specifically §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), 67-19-12(3)(b) or 67-19-3.1 (l)(b). Appellants also assert that the 
Hearing Officer erred in determining that the Department's Executive Director's decision to deny 
Appellants' grievance and the four-step ASI which they requested was not arbitrary, capricious or 
otherwise an abuse of discretion. Finally, Appellants assert that two of the factual findings of the 
Hearing Officer were not supported by substantial evidence and therefore are, ostensibly, insufficient 
to uphold his conclusions of law. Each of these issues will be addressed in the remainder of this 
7For purposes of this Decision and Final Agency Action, theBoard will follow the designations given 
to these positions by the parties at the evidentiary hearing. The Correct! onal Institution Program Coordinator 
will hereinafter be referred to as the "IPC." The Correctional Support Services Supervisor HI will be referred 
' to the "SSHI," and the Correctional Caption will be referred to simply as "Captain." 
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Decision and Final Agency Action. 
G THE BOARD'S APPELLANT STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a)-
(c), (Supp. 2003), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in 
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional 
factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the decision of the 
Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts 
together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were 
considered by the Hearing Officer. 
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BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L PRIOR BOARD CASES ADDRESSING SALARY EQUITY GRIEVANCES 
At the outset, the Board cites with approval to the long line of Board cases holding that 
"equity alone is not a controlling principle upon which employment relations' remedies are 
conditioned " {Division of Environmental Health v Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15,7 (1984))s The 
Board continues to believe the principles supporting this ruling are sound and perhaps best stated 
m Lundv Division of Health Care Financing, 3 PRB 24 (1987) wherein our predecessor board 
stated "When and if cases are determined on the basis of' equity' alone, they may not be dispositive 
to legally sound or logically reasoned decision-making " (Id at 8) 
In Lund, the PRB went on to conclude (hat 
[Tjhere will likely always exist salary inequities for some employees given 
the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring practices, its 
change in philosophies by different administrations and department 
executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel rules m order to 
adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other germane reasons 
that need not be included herein 
(Id) 
Following the Lund decision, the Board again decided a pay equity salary grievance in 
C C Patel v Division of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991) In this case, the Board held 
that 
Preuously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same job 
title are paid at the same rate The State's current pay plans do not 
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees because 
variable factors foster pay rate differences Variations in employees' 
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career 
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money incieases, 
legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments 
(COLAs) which alter the State pay plans entry rates (creating salary 
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted 
service and rehiring [sic], reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other 
job-related factors 
(Id at9)9 
This decision was decided by the Personnel Review Board (PRB) The PRB was the predecessor 
of the Career Service Reviev> Board 
9By way of footnotes m both their Brief on Appeal and in their Post-Hearmg Reply Brief, Appellants 
argue that the Patel decision "supports' their position (Appellants Brief on Appeal at 18 Post-Hearmg 
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The Board finds it significant that at the time the Board decided Patel, the State's pay plan 
also required that the Department design a plan to achieve "equal pay for equal work." {Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-2(4)(b) (1985)) Under that statutory framework, the Patel Board concluded that such 
provisions did not contemplate that all employees with the same job title would be paid the same. 
(Id.) Though there have been changes to the USPMA since Patel, the Board believes there still exist 
substantial and significant similarities between the current legislatively designed compensation 
system and the one existing at the time Patel was decided. 
Based upon these factors, the Board affirms and upholds the prior decisions cited above. The 
Board continues to believe that the State's current pay plan does not contemplate identical pay rates 
for employees performing similar or even the same duties. 
It is the finding of this Board that the State's compensation system, currently codified 
primarily at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12, has been purposely designed by the Legislature so that 
salary ranges for each class of position are to be expansive enough to allow for the normal growth 
and productivity potential of each individual employee, including those assigned to the same 
position. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(c)(ii)). In addition, and as stated by the Board in Pate/, the 
Reply Brief at 3) In support of their argument, Appellants cite to a portion of the Patel decision wherein the 
Board quoted from the hearing officer's Step 5 decision. The pertinent language cited by Appellants 
provides as follows: 
The pay range should reflect equal pay for equal work. (See UCA 
67-19-12(4).) The concept of equal pay for equal work is confined to 
employees with the same classification. Equal pay is not, as Mr. Patel 
argues, a generic concept comparing duties in different classifications. 
Mr. Patel is insured [of] equal pay for equal work within his 
classification." (Highlighted emphasis in original.) 
In the instant case, the Board does not believe the language set forth above "supports" Appellants' 
position. The Board bel ieves this language applies to salary ranges and that salary ranges must reflect equal 
pay for equal work. Moreover, even assuming the hearing officer' s language cit^d by Appellants applies to 
individual salaries, as opposed to salary ranges assigned to employee positions, the Board believes that 
Appellants' reliance on the Board's decision in Patel is misplaced. 
Close review of the Patel decision establishes that the Board never affirmatively adopted the hearing 
officer's language cited to and relied upon by Appellants, In fact, the Board purposely determined "to make 
a more reserved conclusion" than that reached by the Hearing Officer." {Id. at 9) Specifically, the Board 
held that it was not necessary for the hearing officer to make this ^conclusion" to deny Patel3s grievance. 
Instead, the Board reached its decision in Patel based primarily on State statutes which the Board simply 
concluded did not contemplate identical salaries between employees performing the same or similar duties. 
{Id.) 
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State's compensation system was also designed to achieve ''comparability of State salaries to wages 
and salaries paid by private enterprise and other public employment for similar work." (Id. at 10) 
(Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-12(4)(b)) 
Based upon the overall design and complexity of the State compensation system, the Board 
finds it is reasonable to believe - or even expect - that employees will grow and progress through 
their designated salary range at differing salary rates based upon the inevitable exigencies present 
in any workforce,10 It is also reasonable to expect that, on occasion, stresses and strains will result 
regarding salary comparisons or disparities between employees, even those in the same job 
classification. However, absent violation of statute or rule, such disparities are simply insufficient 
to allow an employee to prevail on a wage or salary grievance. 
II. REVIEW OF THE UTAH STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 
REGARDING EQUITABLE AND COMPETITIVE COMPENSATION1 ] 
In apparent recognition that "equity alone" is insufficient to support their grievance, 
Appellants assert that the statutory language cabined within Utah Code Ann. § § 67-19-12(3)(a) and 
(b), and 67-19-3.1(1 )(b) requires that they be paid a salary "equal" to that paid to other individuals 
employed by the Department in their same job classification and performing the same or similar 
duties as Appellants. The specific statutory provision relied upon by Appellants in support of their 
argument provides as follows: 
(3)(a) The director shall prepare, maintain, and revise a position 
classification plan for each employee position not exempt under subsection 
(2) to provide equal pay for equal work 
(b) Classification of positions shall be based on similarity of duties 
performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job requirements 
and the same salary range maybe applied equitably to each position in the 
same class, (Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) (Emphasis 
added)) 
67-19-3.1(1) The Department shall establish a career service system 
designed in a manner that will provide for the effective implementation of 
Indeed, though unnecessary to the Board's decision in this matter, we can think of virtually no 
situation in State government where employees, even those filling the same position, are truly performing 
''equal work." Equal work is certainly not a factor in this case, (Tr J, 29, 47, 61-62, 126-127; TrU at 178-
ISO) (PateUtlQ) 
1
 Providing for equitable and competitive compensation is one of the principles governing the 
interpretation of the USPMA This is codified at Utah Code Ami. § 67-19-3.1. 
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the following merit principles: 
* * * 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive compensation 
(Utah Code Ann. §67-19-3 J(l)(b) (2000) (emphasis added)) 
Appellants assert that these provisions of the USPMA "unequivocally5* create a right for 
Appellants to receive "equal pay for equal work," equitable application of their salary range based 
on an "equal pay for equal work" premise and equitable and competitive compensation. (Appellants7 
on Appeal at 17) 
In addressing this specific argument, the Hearing Officer held that; "Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) do not mean that employees who have similar education and experience 
and who are classified the same because they do the same work, must receive the same salaries. 
They mean such employees must have the same salary ranges." (Step 5 Decision at 5) 
Elaborating on these two statutory provisions, the Hearing Officer held that: 
1 do notread Sections 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) the same way as Grievants do. 
Grievants read those two subsections as meaning employees who have 
similar education and experience and who are classified the same because 
they do the same work, must have the same salaries. I read them to mean 
employees who are classified the same because they do the same work must 
have the same salary ranges. In that regard, while Grievants and the two 
employees with whom they compare themselves do not have the same 
salaries, they do have the same salary ranges. (Id. at 10) 
Further addressing Appellants' statutory claims of entitlement to "equal pay for equal work5' 
(Appellants5 Brief on Appeal at 17), the Hearing Officer concluded that: 
The agency has not violated Utah Code, §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), 67-19-12(3)(b), 
or 67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act by its actions in 
this case because the responsibility for enforcing and carrying out those 
statutes belongs to the Department of Human Resource Management and 
the agency cannot undertake functions which are reserved by law to another 
agency, (Step 5 Decision at 5) 
The Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's decision relating to Appellants' statutory claims 
of entitlement to "equal pay for equal work/' First, the Board agrees that the responsibility for 
designing and implementing the statutes relied upon by Appellants rests with DHRM and not with 
the Department.32 Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-3(7) specifically defines Department as "Department of 
The Board recognizes that this portion of our decision, relating to the responsibility for designing 
and implementing the provisions of the State's position classification and pay plans, is largely unessential 
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Human Resource Management/' Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-3,l(l)(b) specifically charges the 
Department, DHRM> with the responsibility of designing and implementing a career service system 
that allows for "equitable and competitive compensation." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3.1(1 )(b)) 
Likewise, it is the director of DHRM that is charged with the assignment set forth in Utah Code A nn. 
§ 67-19-12(3) of preparing and maintaining a position classification plan to provide "equal pay for 
equal work" and to ensure that the classification of positions reflect that "the same job requirements 
and the same salary range be applied equitably to each position in the same class." (Id) 
The Board believes that a plain reading of the State's entire compensation system codified 
primarily at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12 requires that the director of DHRM design and administer 
its provisions. Indeed, Utah Code Ann § 67-19-8(1) and (2) provide that the design and 
administration of the State's classification system and pay plan are functions DHRM must perform 
and cannot delegate.13 The Department's role is limited by statute to assisting DHRM by 
recommending position classifications and grade allocations, (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-9(2)). 
Second, and as touched upon in Section I above, the Board does not believe the Department's 
actions in this case violate the statutes relied upon by Appellants to support their claim of entitlement 
to "equal pay for equal work." As stated previously, the Board does not believe that the State's 
current compensation system requires that employees who are in the same job or position 
classification and performing the same or similar duties must receive the same individual salaries. 
It is sufficient if each employee position within the State's position classification plan is assigned 
to a salary range allowing for equal pay for equal work between comparable employee positions. 
The emphasis of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(3) is on employee positions not individual 
salaries. Indeed, Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-12(4)(c) specifically contemplates that each employee 
position will be assigned "to a salary range broad enough to reflect the normal growth and 
productivity potential of employees" assigned to a particular position. 
Reading these statutes as a whole, the Board does not believe that the Legislature 
contemplated that the "normal growth and productivity potential" of employees assigned to a 
in light of our ultimate conclusions that the statutes relied upon by Appellants in this case, specifically Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 67-19-3.1, 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b), were not violated. However, the Board has chosen to 
address this issue for clarity purposes. 
bThe specific language set forth in Utah Code Ann § 67-19-8 states that: "The department shall 
perform the following functions. . . .(1) design and administration of the state pay plan; (2) design and 
administration of the state classification system and procedures for determining schedule assignments." 
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position would be in lockstep. Rather, salary ranges are designed to enable employees, once 
assigned to a position, to advance through the salary range based upon their own individual growth 
or productivity. Based upon these factors, it is reasonable to expect variations in individual salaries 
between employees within the same salary range. 
In the instant case, the facts establish that Appellant Burr became a Captain in April 1992. 
(Gvt Ex. 12, Agency Ex. 3; Tr.I at 104, 113; Tr.II at 186). Appellant Clark became a Captain in 
Junel993. (Gvt. Ex. 12, Agency Ex. 3; Tr.I at 128; Tr.II at 186), Since those dates, the Department 
has transferred Appellants on several occasions between the positions of Captain, IPC and SSHL14 
(Gvt. Ex.12). These transfers involved no loss of salary or salary range to Appellants. (Gvt. Ex. 12). 
From the record, it appears that once an employee attains the position of Captam, IPC, or SSIII the 
Department has with some regularity transferred its employees among these three positions, 
(Tr.Iat29, 56). 
Significantly, the Board notes that at all times relevant to this matter, the salary range 
attached to the positions of Captain, IPC, and SSIII were/are identical (Tr.I at 26,28, 57, 64, 174). 
The salary range attached to these positions is 47-64. (Id.)}5 In addition, it is clear from the record 
that the Department, for staffing and perhaps other purposes, has treateu the positions of Captain, 
IPC and SSL! as functionally interchangeable.16 {Id.; Tr.I at 43; Gvt. Ex. 3). 
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr are the specific individuals v/ith whom Appellants compare 
themselves to establish their claims. Mr. Carlson became an SSIII in September 1993. (Gvt. Ex. 12; 
Tr.I at 383-384). Since that time, Mr. Carlson has also held the position of Captain and IPC. (Id.). 
See Footnote 6 on page 5 
15Significantly, Appellants do not challenge that they are being paid within their appropriate salary 
lange. Based upon the record as a whole, the Board finds that Appellants are being paid within their salary 
range. The Board also finds that Appellants have received all merited salary increases commensurate with 
their positions as captains and in relation to the duties and responsibilities they perform and the promotions 
they have received. (Tr.II at 181-182, 191, 208-209; Agency Ex. 1) 
16In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer found that "while the positions of IPC, SSIII and 
Captain have been treated over the years somewhat interchangeable, they are not Captain positions because 
their functions are different." (Step 5 Decision, 33 Finding of Fact 25). 
To the extent our findings here correct those of the Hearing Officer on this limited fact, they are 
corrected. (See CSRB rule R137-l-22(4)(a).) However, for the reasons set forth in this decision, this 
correction is of little or no relevance and does not alter our determination to sustain the Hearing Officer's 
decision. 
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Likewise, Mr. Harr became an SSIH hi September 1993. (Gvt Exs, 6,13; Tri at 66)J7 
The facts of this case establish that since at least 1993, Messrs, Burr, Clark, Carlson and Harr 
haye each occupied various positions within the Department having differing functions or 
assignments, but based upon the overall duties and responsibilities of those positions, the 
Department has treated these positions as functionally interchangeable. The facts also establish, 
however, that both prior to and after these individuals obtained their position of Captain, IPC or 
SSIII, their career paths have been diverse and separate from each othei. 
For example, each of these individuals was hired at different starting salaries.] 8 (Gvt. Ex. 12) 
Even at the time these individuals became what Appellants call "Captains," their salaries were 
variant ranging between $12.27 per hour and $14.46 per hour (Id.) The differences in these 
individuals' current salaries has also been impacted by numerous factors including Cost of Living 
Adjustments (COLAs), merit increases, probationary increases, Market Comparability Analyses 
(MCAs) and promotions. (Gvt. Exs. 6,12)19 With respect to Mr. Carlson, the facts clearly establish 
that in March 1994, he received a substantial upward salary adjustment for temporarily assuming 
responsibilities of a higher level position. (Gvt. Ex. 12; Tr.II at 207-208). Based upon the 
evidentiary record, the Board finds this salary adjustment appropriate and does not believe that 
1
 Though Mr. Harr has held other positions since becoming an SSIII, he has not had the position of 
IPC or Captain. (Id.) 
18Mr. Harr had the highest starting salary rate of $11.36 per hour. Mr. Harr was hired in 1990. 
Conversely, Mr. Clark's starting salary was $6.22 per hour. Mr. Clark was hired in 1983. Significantly, the 
Board notes that in 1990, when Mr. Harr was hired, his starting salary of $ 11.36 per hour was nearly a dollar 
more per hour than what Mr. Clark was making in 1990. By 1990, Mr. Clark had been employed with the 
Department for approximately seven years. Mr. Burr, who like Mr. Harr was hired in 1990, had a beginning 
salary nearly $1.50 per hour less than Mr. Harr. (Gvt. Ex. 12). 
19With respect to merit and COLA increases, it is to be expected that those will never be uniformly 
applied to all employees holding the same position. If merit increases mean anything at all, they mean that 
employees receive increases based upon their individual productivity and growth in comparison with other 
similarly situated employees. (See Utah Code Ann. § 67-1942(4)(c)(iiI)). In addition, the disparity in 
relation to COLAs is best illustrated by the following example. If Employee A is making $10.00 per hour 
and Employee B is making $20.00 per hour, a one percent COLA increase across the board will result in a 
$. 10 per hour raise for Employee A and a 5.20 per hour raise for Employee B. The record establishes that 
since being hired, these individuals have all received merit and COLA increases. Based upon our discussion 
above, it is not reasonable to expect that these increases would be uniform. These are additional 
circumstances leadingthis Board to conclude that Appellants' reliance on Utah Code Ann, §§ 67-19-3.Land 
67-10-12(3)(a) and (b) is misplaced. 
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69 Page 13 
granting such an adjustment was an abuse of discretion on the part of the Department.20 
As stated best by the Board mPateL variations in employees' individual salaries "result from 
such factors and conditions as promotions, career mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit 
money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments (COLAs) 
which alter the State pay plans1 entry rates (creating salary compression), length of service, long-term 
leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings, reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other 
job-related factors." (Patel at 9). 
The Board finds many of these factors present in the instant case. (Gvt Ex.12; 
Agency Ex. 3) Moreover, Appellants are clearly being paid within their salary range and have 
received the salary increases to which they are entitled. (TrJI at 181-182, 191, 209-210; Agency 
Ex, 1) 
Applying the facts of this case to the statutory provisions governing the State's compensation 
system, including those relied on by Appellants, the Board finds the Hearing Officer's Step 5 
Decision to be correct. Furthermore, the Board simply does not believe that the law, as cited by 
Appellants, requires that employees whose positions are classified the same and who do the same 
or similar work, e.g., Captains, IPCs and SSIIIs, must receive the same individual salaries. 
Therefore, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision on this matter, 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REGARDING SALARY INCREASES 
On appeal to this Board, Appellants do not challenge the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of 
Law that "[t]he granting or denying of an ASI21 in accordance with Utah Administrative Code, 
R477-7-4(ll) is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head." (Step 5 Decision, 
Conclusion of Law 5, at 4). The Board agrees. 
In Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 568, 754, the Utah Court of Appeals 
addressed the jurisdictional parameters of the CSRB. In Lopez, the Court held that: 
Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute 
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain 
benefit, the employee may not demand it as a right. . » Lopez has failed to 
Again, to the extent our findings here correct the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact 29, it is so 
corrected. (CSRB rule R137-l-22(4)(a)). 
21
 ASI is the common acronym for the DHRM rule allowing for administrative salary increases. As 
stated in footnote 4 above, at the time Appellants filed their grievance, this rule could be found at Utah 
Administrative Code R4?7-7-4(l 1). It is currently found at Utah Administrative Code R477-6-4(10). 
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identify any personnel rule that was violated by the Commission's refusal 
to allow him to job share. Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied. 
(IdAt 9) (emphasis added). 
Based upon the Lopez decision, it is clear that the CSRB has no jurisdiction to review 
discretionary personnel decisions.22 Recognizing the need for such a statutory or administrative 
mandate, Appellants argue that such a mandate is cabined within the three previously cited statutes 
codified in the USPMA. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 19 and 20). As previously discussed at 
length above, the Board simply does not read the statutes as mandating equal pay for employees 
employed in the same job classification and performing the same or similar duties. Absent the 
finding of such a mandate, this Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision.23 
Next, Appellants argue that the Department's Executive Director's decision to deny their ASI 
was arbitrary, capricious and constituted an abuse of discretion in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(h). Appellants base this claim on the fact that in 1998, when Appellants' initial 
grievance was denied, the Department's Executive Director granted another employee within the 
Department a seven-step ASL24 
The statute relied upon by Appellants provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
* * * 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
~ The appellate record is essentially void of any challenge to the discretionary nature of the AST rule. 
The only conceivable challenge the Board could identify is located at page 19 of the Appellants' Brief on 
Appeal wherein Appellants infer that the ASI rule is not discretionary. On page 19, the Appellants provide 
"[e]ven if this rule (AS!) is interpreted to grant disci etion . . . ." 
^The Board notes that this case relates to "wage" or "salary". Appellants have alleged throughout 
the grievance process that the way to remedy their alleged "pay inequity" or wage disparity in comparison 
with other Department employees would be through an "ASI". The Board notes however, that absent the 
underlying wage or salary issues present in this case, the CSRB would not even have "jurisdiction" to 
address ASIs. Lopez was a jurisdictional review. The Court clearly held that the CSRB does not have 
"jurisdiction" over discretionary personnel matters. 
24The evidentiary record identifies this other individual as James Braithwaite. (Tr.I at 86-89, Tr.II 
at 227). 
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In addressing Appellants' argument, the Board notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer that one 
instance, wherein the Department granted an ASI to another employee, does not equate to a "prior 
practice" as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). In addressing this issue, the Hearing 
Officer correctly stated that "characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a 'prior practice5 maybe 
stretching the meaning of the word 'practice5," (Step 5 Decision at 12 n.6). The Board simply 
does not find that the evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient to establish a "prior practice'5 
by the Department. 
Moreover, the evidence does not establish that the Executive Director's decision to deny 
Appellants' ASI was arbitrary or capricious. Executive Director Haun clearly examined the facts 
Appellants used in support of their request for an ASI and determined, within his lawful discretion, 
that Appellants had received all "the increases to which they were entitled." In making this 
determination, Executive Director Haun also noted that Appellants had, at various times during their 
employment, received ASIs, promotions and other increases. (Agency Ex. 1) 
However, even assuming, which the Board does not, that the granting of a single ASI by the 
Department creates a "prior practice55 binding the Department, the Board finds that Appellants 
reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 67-46b-l et seq25 is misplaced. The statutory scope and applicability 
of UAPA specifically exempt from its provisions internal personnel actions within an agency 
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions. The specific language provides 
as follows: 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(e) [Ijnternal personnel actions within an agency concerning its own 
employees, or judicial review of those actions; 
Executive Director Haun's departmental level or Step 4 decision was clearly an internal 
personnel action and therefore exempt from the provisions of UAPA. The Legislature has 
specifically designed and created the USPMA and the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101 et seq to address internal personnel actions within an 
agency concerning its own employees and review of those actions. 
Based upon these factors, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to 
this issue. The Department's actions simply do not violate the provisions of UAPA which do not 
~ This statute is commonly referred to as the Utah Administrative Procedures Act or UAPA. 
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apply to internal personnel actions, nor is there evidence that Executive Director Haun acted 
arbitrarily or inconsistently in denying Appellants' grievance. 
DECISION 
After careful review of the entire evidentiary record, the Board believes that the Hearing 
Officer's findings of fact relevant to address the legal issues raised by Appellants in their Brief on 
Appeal, are reasonable, rational and supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, it is clear that the 
Hearing Officer correctly applied the relevant statutes, policies and rules to the relevant facts of this 
case. Finally, the Board believes that the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision was reasonable and 
rational based upon the relevant findings and correct application of the law. 
After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record and studying the issued raised by 
Appellants before this Board, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision for the 
reasons set forth herein and hereby denies Appellants' appeal to this Board. 
DATED this 22nd day of December 2003, 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Joan M, Gallegos, Member 
Felix J. McGowan, Member 
Dale L. Whittle, Member 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Administrative Code , R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63~46b-13, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
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Exhibit G 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
CRAIG BURR and 
LOWELL H. CLARK, 
Grievants, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. 18 CSRB/ELO. 259 
Hearing Officer: J. Francis Vale rga 
THE STEP 5 HEARING TO DETERMINE the above-entitled matter was held on/ ugust 14 
and 15, 2002, Conference Room 1120, State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
before J. Francis Valerga, Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer. Craig Burr and I owell H. 
Clark (Grievants), were present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. rQie Utah 
Department of Corrections (Agency and UDC), was represented by Patrick B. Nolan, \ssistant 
Attorney General. David Salazar was present as the Agency representative. A certif ed court 
reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings. Witnesses were placed under oath. T istimony 
and documentary evidence were received into the record. The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, 
Utah Code, Section 63-46b-2(l)(h) (2002), now makes and enters the following: 
AUTHORITY 
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold this Step 5 T earing is 
found at Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406 (2002) and Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1-1 et seq. 
(2002). 
ISSUES 
Are Grievants entitled to prevail in their salary grievance? If so, what is the appropriate-
remedy? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Stipulated Facts1 
1. Grievants Burr and Clark are career service employees and were career service er lployees 
at the time of filing the grievance on or about May 28,1998. Both Grievants are presently employed 
by the Utah Department of Corrections. They are both assigned to the Gunnison Prison. 
2. Both Grievants are seekmg a four-step increase which they allege will compensate them 
in a manner consistent with others who have equal or less education and/or experience. 
3. Since he filed his grievance, Grievant Burr has received the following step inc 'eases: 
27 June 1998, Merit to Step 51 
27 June 1998, ASI to Step 52 
26 June 1999. Merit to Step 53 
26 June 1999, ASI to Step 55 
24 June 2000, ASI to Step 56 
23 June 2001, Merit to Step 57 
23 June 2001, ASI to Step 58 
1 June 2002, no increase 
Since the filing of the grievance, Grievant Burr has received 8 step increases. 
4. Since Grievant Clark filed his grievance, he has received the following step increases: 
27 June 1998, Merit to Step 50 
27 June 1998, ASI to Step 51 
26 June 1999, Merit to Step 52 
26 June 1999, ASI to Step 54 
24 June 2000, ASI to Step 55 
23 June 2001, Merit to Step 56 
23 June 2001, ASI to Step 57 
Since the filing of the grievance, Grievant Clark has received 8 step increases. 
5. The Step 4 Final Order denying the grievance was signed by the Executive Director on 
18 July 2000. 
6. Grievant Burr has a Bachelors Degree in Business Management 
7. As of April 2001, William Carlson had occupied the position of Captain for 4i months. 
8. As of April 2001, Grievant Burr was earning $20.72 an hour. As of June 2001, and 
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Grievant Burr is earning $21.88 an hour. 
The stipulated facts herein are written exactly as submitted by the parties at the Step 5 hearing. The only 
exception is some minor editing by the Hearing Ofncer for the purpose of maintaining internal consistency with the 
rest of the Decision, Style changes were not made. 
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9. As of April 2001, Grievant Clark was earning $20.17 an hour. As of June 2001, and 
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Grievant Clark is earning $21.29 an hour. 
10. As of April 2001, Mr. Carlson was earning $23.09 an hour. As of June 2001, and 
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Mr. Carlson is earning $24.38 an hour. 
11. Grievant Burr was hired by the Agency in September 1990. 
12. Grievant Burr made grade 25 in May 1991. 
13. Grievant Clark was hired by the Agency in November 1983. 
14. Grievant Clark made grade 25 in June 1993. 
15. Mr. Carlson was hired by the Agency in October 1991-
16. Mr. Carlson made grade 25 in September 1993. 
17. Randall Keven Harr was hired by the Agency in June 1990. 
18. Mr. Harr made grade 26 in September 1993. 
19. Mr. Harr was making in excess of $25.00 an hour as of January 2001. 
Facts Found at the Hearing 
20. At the time Grievant Burr filed his grievance in May 1998, he held the position of 
Correctional Captain with a salary range between steps 47 and 64. He was being paid at ste p 5 0, and 
became a Captain in April 1992. 
21. At the time Grievant Clark filed his grievance in May 1998, he held the position of 
Correctional Captain with a salary range between steps 47 and 64. He was being paid at step 49, and 
became a Captain in June 1993. 
22. Unlike Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr do not have college 
degrees. 
23. Both Grievants have been transferred by Agency management between the po sitions of 
IPC, SS HI, and Captain since becoming Captains.2 
24. The salary ranges for the positions of IPC, SS III, and Captain are all the same, i.e., 
steps 47 through 64. 
25. While the positions of PC, SS in, and Captain have been treated over the years 
somewhat interchangeably, they are not all Captain positions because their functions are different. 
2
 The terms "IPC," USS III," and "Captain" as defined in the Step 5 Hearing stand for Coirectior al 
Institution Program Coordinator, Correctional Support Services Supervisor III, and Correctional Captain, 
respectively. 
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26. The positions of IPC, SS HI, and Captain are all on the same level of the Agency's 
organizational chart. 
27. The Agency has on occasion addressed pay inequity issues by granting admir istrative 
salary increases (ASFs) as provided for in administrative rule R477-7-4(l 1). One of the ASFs 
previously granted was a seven- step increase given to an employee named Braithwaite at or about 
the time the ASFs requested by Grievants were denied. 
28. The positions of IPC, SS III, and Captain are benchmarked to the correctors officer 
position. 
29. Notwithstanding the fact that different positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years, 
performance evaluations, and career paths might potentially account for the differences in pay 
between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons were 
identified for the differences in pay. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The burden of proof in non-disciplinary grievances is on the person brirging the 
grievance. Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (2000), Therefore, since this is anon-disciplinary 
grievance, Grievants have the burden of proof. 
2. The standard used to determine whether Grievants have met their burden of proof, is 
"substantial evidence." Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (2000). Therefore, Grievants must 
prove the allegations in their grievance by substantial evidence. 
3. "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla of evidence," but less than "the 
weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is such quantum and type of "relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Zissi v. State Tax 
Commission, 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 116 P. 2d 63, 68 
(Utah App. 1989). 
4. The evidence in this case shows that Grievants have received all salary increases to which 
they were entitled by law and are being compensated fairly based upon their experience, education 
and longevity. 
5. The granting or denying of an ASI in accordance with Utah Administrate Code, 
R477-7-4(l 1) is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head. 
6. The denial by the then executive director, Pete Haun, of the ASFs sought by Grievants 
under R477-7-4(l 1) was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion. 
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7. The Agency has not violated Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 6749-12 (3)0), or 
67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act by its actions in this case because the 
responsibility for enforcing and carrying out those statutes belongs to the Department of Human 
Resource Management and the Agency cannot undertake functions which are reserved by law to 
another agency. 
8. Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a) and (b) do not mean that employees who have 
similar education and experience and who are classified the same because they do the same work, 
must receive the same salaries. They mean such employees must have the same salary ranges. 
9. The decision to deny an ASI at Step 4 of the State Grievance and Appeals Procedure is 
an internal personnel action, and is therefore exempt from the provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act in accordance with Utah Code, Section 63-46b-l(2). 
THE GRIEVANTS* CASE 
Grievants argue that they are the victims of a pay inequity in that two other Agency 
employees in their same job classification do the same work they do but are paid more.3 Grievants 
claim that suchpay inequity violates three state statutes, to wit: Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 
67-19-12 (3)(b), and 67-19-3.1 (l)(b). The three statutes read in pertinent part as follow*'.: 
The director shall prepare, maintain, and revise a position 
classification plan for each employee position not exempted under 
Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for equal work. Utah Code, 
67-19-12 (3)(a). 
Classification of positions shall be based upon similarity of duties 
performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job 
requirements and the same salary range may be applied equitably to 
each position in the same class. Utah Code, 67-19-12 (3)(b). 
The department shall establish a career service system designed in a 
manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the 
following merit principles: 
. • . .providing for equitable and competitive compensation. Utah 
Code, §6749-3.1 (l)(b). 
The two employees with whom Grievants compare themselves are William Carlson and Randall Keven 
Hair. Grievants Burr and Clark make $21.88 and S21.29 respectively, while Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr m ike S2438 
and over $25.00 respectively. As set forth in rinding no, 29, many factors could account for the difference s in pay, 
but no specific reasons were pointed out by either side. Since Grievants bear the burden of proof in this c ise} it was 
incumbent on them to put forth more evidence on that issue. 
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Furthermore, Grievanf s argue, a mechanism exists that would allow the Agency to remedy 
the pay inequity. That mechanism is an ASI as provided for in R477-7-4 (11) The AS." rule, as 
it existed when the grievances were filed, read in pertinent part as follows: 
(11) Administrative Salary Increase 
The executive director or commissioner authorizes and approves 
Administrative Salary increases under the following parameters: 
(c) Justifications for Administrative Salary Increases shall be: 
* * * 
(iii) Supported by issues such as: special agency conditions or 
problems, equity issues, or other unique situations or considerations 
in the agency. (Emphasis supplied). 
Grievants argue that the then executive director, Pete Haun, used the rule tc grant a 
seven-step ASI to an employee named Braithwaite while contemporaneously denying the r request 
for four-step ASFs. Grievants argue that while the granting of an ASI is discretionary with the 
Agency director, the denial of their ASFs was arbitrary and capricious in view of the ASI granted 
to Braithwaite. 
As support for their argument, Grievants cite a provision in the Utah Admi listrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) that addresses the circumstances under which a party can seek judi :ial relief 
from an administrative agency. The provision in question reads as follows: 
(h) [relief can be granted when] the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency }s prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reason 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency^ or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. (Emphasis supplied). 
Utah Code, 63-46(b)-16(4)(h) (1997). 
Quoting from a portion of footnote 12 in Grievant's Posthearing Brief Grievant's state: 
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"Haun cannot (consistent with merit principles) grant an ASI to one employee so as to remedy a pay 
inequity and then deny another employee's request on the sole basis that he has discretion to do so 
under DHRM rules." 
Anticipating the Agency's reliance on a long line of PRB and CSRB cases dem/ing pay 
inequity grievances, Grievants argue that: (a) the doctrine of stare decisis (reliance on previous case 
law) does not apply to administrative proceedings; and (b) even if stare decisis does apply, their 
case is distinguishable from those previous pay inequity cases because it involves the violation of 
the above-mentioned statutes. 
THE AGENCY'S CASE 
The Agency responds to Grievanfs case by arguing that:4 (a) the doctrine of stare decisis 
does apply to administrative proceedings, and thus, the long line of PRB and CSRB cases denying 
pay inequity grievances does apply in this case;5 (b) the granting of an ASI under R477-7-4(l 1) is 
discretionary with the executive director, and the decision denying the AST s requested by Grievants 
in this case was not an abuse of that discretion; and (c) the Agency did not violate the statutes cited 
by Grievants because the Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM), not UDC, is 
responsible for carrying out those statutes. 
In short, the Agency argues that Grievants received all salary increases to which they were 
entitled, and are being paid appropriately, considering their experience, education, and 1 Dngevity. 
Any other increase could only come as an ASI pursuant to R477-7-4(l 1). ASFs, by law, cam be 
denied or granted at the discretion of the Agency executive director. The Agency argues that the 
decision by the executive director denying the ASI's was a proper exercise of discretion, and thus, 
the grievance should be denied. 
DISCUSSION 
My analysis of this matter will be broken down into three areas: previous pay inequity cases; 
statutes; and administrative rule. 
The Agency raised additional arguments in its pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, but the three 
arguments set forth above are representative of all their arguments. 
The pay inequity cases cited by the Agency include the following: CC Patel v. Division of 
Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991): Lund v Division of Health Care Financing, 3 PRB 24 (1987); and 
Division of Environmental Health v. Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15 (1984). 
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Previous Pay Inequity Cases 
Pay inequity grievances have traditionally not fared well in the State's career service system, 
whether decided by the Career Service Review Board (CSRB), or its predecessor body - the 
Personnel Review Board (PRB). 
In reviewing a pay inequity case on appeal from Step 5 as early as 1984, the PRB \acated a 
hearing officer's decision that had awarded a two-step increase based on pay inequity. After 
discussing the legal definition of the term "equity/' the PRB held, "[e]quity alone . . . is not a 
controlling principle upon which employment relations5 remedies are conditioned." Drnsion of 
Environmental Health v. Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15, 8 (1984). 
Three years later in another pay inequity case, Lund v. Division of Health Care Financing, 
3 PRB 24 (1987), the PRB quoted as follows from its previous decision in Pitkin, "[w]hm and if 
cases are determined on the basis of 'equity' alone, they may not be dispositive to legally sound or 
logically reasoned decision-making." Pitkin at 8, The PRB went on to say; 
[T]here will likely always exist salary inequities for some employees 
given the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring 
practices, its change in philosophies by different administrations and 
department executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel 
rules in order to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for 
other germane reasons that need not be included herein. Lund at 8. 
Since then, the CSRB has followed Lund in pay inequity cases. For example, in C C Patel 
•v. Division of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991), the Board referred to Lund and said: 
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same 
job title are paid at the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not 
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees 
because variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in 
employees' salaries result from such factors and conditions as 
promotions, career mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit 
money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost 
of living adjustments (COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry 
rates (creating salary compression), length of service, long-term 
leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings [sic], 
reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job-related factors. 
PateUt9. 
In their post hearing briefs, Grievants try valiantly to challenge the application of these pay 
inequity decisions to their case. Their challenge is waged primarily on two fronts: (a) that the 
doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in administrative proceedings, and therefore, prioi-PRB and 
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CSRB cases are irrelevant in this proceeding; and (b) that Lund and Pitkin are distinguishable 
because they are based on equity alone, while their case involves the violation of three state statutes. 
In my opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis does apply in this proceeding. I find the cases 
cited by the Agency on this issue to be persuasive. In Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We have previously stated that stare decisis has limited applicability 
to administrative agency cases, see Williams v. Public Serv. Comm }n. 
754 P.2d 41, 52 (Utah 1988), but that is because of the innumerable 
kinds of decisions that administrative agencies make. This limitation 
does not apply where administrative law making is done pursuant 
to formal procedures similar to those employed in judicial 
proceedings. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis supplied.) 846 P.2d at 
1252. 
Furthermore, the holding in Mountain States was upheld by the Court in Steiner Corp. v. 
AuditingDiv. of the Utah State Tax Comm '*, 979 P.2d 357 (Utah 1999). The Court saic: 
Mountain States [cited above] held that rules established in formal 
agency adjudications have the force of stare decisis in future agency 
decisions. [Citation omitted.] 
Mountain States stands for the proposition that it would be arbitrary 
and capricious for an agency to apply a different rule of law in a 
future case with similar facts. See id. at 1252. It is as arbitrary and 
capricious to apply the same law to the same facts and reach a 
different result as it is to apply a different rule in a factually similar 
situation. Simply put "Stare decisis means that like facts will receive 
like treatment in a court of law." [Citations omitted.] The holding of 
an agency adjudication, or the application of a rule of law to the facts 
in that case, binds an agency in subsequent decisions under Mountain 
States. 979P.2dat36L 
I think Mountain States is good law here because administrative law making before the 
CSRB "is done pursuant to formal procedures similar to those employed injudicial proceedings.'' 
846 P.2d at 1252. The fact that the CSRB has no administrative rule mandating that Step 5 hearing 
officers are bound by Step 6 CSRB decisions or other Step 5 decisions issued by other hearing 
officers is not persuasive. 
Statutes 
Grievants also attempt to distinguish their case from prior pay inequity cases decided by the 
PRB and CSRB by arguing their case involves more than just a pay inequity. Grievants claim the 
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additional issue in their case is the violation of three statures in the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act. Those statutes are Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 67-19-12 (3)(b), and 67-
19-3.1.1 find their argument unpersuasive for three reasons. 
First, the responsibility for enforcing and carrying out the statutes in question belongs to 
DHRM, not to UDC. The term "Department" is defined in Section 67-19-3(7) to mean DHRM. 
Thus, where Section 67-19-3.1, charges the department with the responsibility of establishing a 
career service system that will provide for "equitable and competitive compensation/' the 
responsibility lies with DHRM, not UDC. Similarly, the term "director" as it is used ii Section 
67-19-12(3)(a), refers to the DHRM director, not to the UDC director, because, in accordance with 
Section 67-19-8, it is DHRM, not UDC, that is tasked with the responsibility of designing and 
administering the state pay plan and classification system. Thus the responsibility to "prepare, 
maintain, and revise a position classification plan for each employee position... to provide equal 
pay for equal work" belongs to the DHRM director, not the UDC director. The foregoing analysis 
is supported by Section 67-19-9(2) which limits the role of State agencies to one of "recom mending 
position classifications and grade allocations." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Second, even if the responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and revising the State pay plan 
and classification system belonged to UDC, I do not read Sections 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) the same 
way as do Grievants. Grievants read those two subsections as meaning employees who ha\ e similar 
education and experience and who are classified the same because they do the same work, r aust have 
the same salaries. I read them to mean employees who ate classified the same because ft ey do the 
same work must have the same salary ranges, In that regard, while Grievants and the two e nployees 
with whom they compare themselves do not have the same salaries, they do have the same salary 
ranges. 
Third, in addition to not being legally required to pay the same salaries to employees who 
have similar education, seniority, and identical classifications, it is impractical to do so. The reasons 
for that are set forth in Patel, Lund, and Pitkin. They include such factors as promotions, career 
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money increases, legislatively imposed statewide 
salary freezes, cost of living adjustments, length of service, long term leaves of absence, interrupted 
service and rehires, reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job related factors. 
In short, even though Grievants argue that their case involves more than "equity alone," I do 
not agree with their argument alleging statutory violations. 
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AdministrativeRuIe 
Grievants argue that R477-7-4(ll) provides the remedy to correct their pay inequity. 
Grievanf s argument in this regard is set forth above in the presentation of the Agency's case and will 
not be restated here. I disagree with Grievanf s argument for two reasons. 
First, the granting of an ASI is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head. 
R477-7-11(11) states: "The agency head . . , is the final authority for salary actions witliin these 
guidelines. The agency head . . . shall answer any challenge or grievance resulting from an 
administrative salary increase." Id Therefore, even though one of the justifications set fo th in the 
ASI rule is "equity reasons," an executive director may choose not to use it. 
In. Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992), the court said: 
Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute 
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a 
certain benefit, the employee may not demand it as a matter of right. 
Id. at 574, 
Grievants attempt to distinguish their case from Lopez by arguing that their case involves 
a "statutory mandate" while Lopez does not. Grievants state: 
[W]hen there is a statutory mandate, the Legislature creates an 
entitlement and a right in the employee. Such a right is created by the 
three (3) provisions contained in the USPMA . . . and no additional 
violation of rules needs to be proven by Grievants. Grievants' 
Posthearing Brief at 14 and 15. 
However, as stated previously in this decision, I do not agree that the three USPMA statutes 
constitute a mandate in favor of Grievants. Accordingly, I find that Lopez does apply in this case. 
Second, Grievants argue that the Agency's granting of an ASI to Mr. Braithwaite, while 
contemporaneously denying their ASI request, was arbitrary and capricious because it was 
inconsistent. In support of their argument, Grievants cite Section 63-46b-16 (4)(h)(iii) o ""the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) which provides for relief if the agency action is. 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and reason that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency. 
I believe Grievanf s reliance on UAPA is misplaced. In addressing the 5 cope and 
applicability of UAPA, Section 63-46b-l (2) reads as follows: 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
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* * * 
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions 
within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review 
of those actions, (Emphasis supplied). 
Proceedings at Steps 5 and 6 of the grievance procedure are not internal personnel actions 
and for that reason UAPA does apply to matters heard at that level However, the decision by the 
then executive director, Pete Harm, to deny Grievanf s request for ASF s, was a Step 4 deci sion, i.e., 
an internal agency personnel action, and is therefore exempt from the provisions of UAP \..6 
DECISION 
For the foregoing reasons, the grievance should be? and hereby is denied. 
DATED this 13th day of December 2002. 
icis Valerga 
' Hearing/Presiding Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration nrnst be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
For that reason it is not necessary to address in depth the case of Pickett v. Utah Department of 
Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1993) which Gnevants rely on to claim that they met their initial butien of 
establishing a prima facie case of inconsistent treatment. Gnevants argue that because they met their initLil burden, 
the burden shifted to the Agency to demonstrate a "iair and rational** basis for the Agency's so called inconsistent 
treatment Admittedly Director Harm's final order did not specifically address why Mr. Braithwaite's AS v was 
granted while Gnevant's ASI's were denied. However, his final order does indicate in the fourth paragraph on page 
1 that any comparisons outside the rank of captain would be comparing "apples to oranges." That reference, coupled 
with the fact that Mr. Braithwaite is a licensed professional pharmacist, rather than a captain, arguably explains 
Director Haun's reason for treating them differently. Moreover, characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a 
'"prior practice" may be stretching the meaning of the word "practice." No evidence was submitted regarding how 
many ASI's were denied. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 18th day of December 2002, (1) I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION AND ORDER in 
the matter of Craig Burr and Lowell Clark v Utah Department of Corrections to the folio mng: 
Craig Burr 
595 West 350 North 
Salina UT 84654-1035 
Lowell H.Clark 
155 North 600 West 
Manti UT 84642-1234 
(2) I sent an E-mail with a copy of the original document attached to the following: 
Michael P. Chabries 
Executive Director 
Department of Corrections 
14717 South Minuteman Drive 
Draper UT 84020-9549 
Linda Whitney 
HR Manager 
Department of Corrections 
14717 South Minuteman Drive 
Draper UT 84020-954 
David Salazar 
HR Director 
Department of Corrections 
14717 South Minuteman Drive 
Draper UT 84020-9549 
and 3) I faxed a copy to: 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Attorney at Law 
136 South Main Street, Suite 221 
Salt Lake City UT 84101-3659 
Patrick Nolan 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Agency Counsel Division 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0857 
^^O^C^U^ 2g££_ 
Claudia L. Jones 
Legal Secretary 
S 
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STATE OF UTAH 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD 
In the Matter of the Appeal of: 
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, 
Appellant, 
v. 
JAY B. PITKIN and 
CALVIN K. SUDWEEKS, 
Respondents. 
D E C I S I O N 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing, pursuant to 
notification, on Friday, August 31, 1984 at 10:00 AM, in the Governor's Board 
Room, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah- The following members of 
the Personnel Review Board ("Board") were present: Peter Fillmore, Acting 
Chairman; Marguerite L. Horton; Dalmas H. Nelson and Jose L. Trujillo. 
Absent: Anita C. Bradford. 
The Division of Environmental Health ("Appellant") was represented by 
Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Tax and Business 
Regulation Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General. Jay B. Pitkin and 
Calvin K. Sudweeks ("Respondents") were represented by Jamis M. Johnson, 
Attorney at Law with Fabian & Clendenin, which firm represents the Utah Public 
Employees' Association. Mr. Pitkin was present; Mr. Sudweeks was absent. 
Karen Suzuki-Hashimoto, Director, and Felix McGowan, Bureau Manager, both of 
the Division of Personnel Management ("DPM"), were also present, as interested 
persons. 
A court reporter made a verbatim record of the appeal hearing before this 
Board, which has not been transcribed to date. 
This matter is properly before the Board which has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Utah State Personnel Management Act, as found at Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 67-19-20 through 67-19-25, 1953, as amended, (1983 Supp.), and 
the Board*s own regulatory provisions published as the State Employees* 
Grievance and Appeals Procedure (1983 ed.). 
Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks (hereinafter "Respondents") advanced their 
respective grievances to a Step 5 evidentiary hearing• However, the Division 
afterwards appealed the evidentiary determination to the Board at Step 6. On 
appeal the Division now shoulders the burdens of proof and persuasion. 
The Board has reviewed Hearing Officer Lawrence Epperson's ("Hearing 
Officer") Step 5 decision along with both parties1 briefs. Also, the Board 
members have reviewed the transcript of John Gisler's testimony as well as the 
main volume of the Step 5 transcript. The Board took the matter under 
advisement following oral arguments on August 31 and met in an extended 
executive session. No decision was reached at that time. Board members 
subsequently reconvened in an executive session on Wednesday, October 10, 
1984. The Board, being duly apprised in the facts and issues of the case!s 
premises, now makes the following conclusions and decision. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This matter consumed considerable time in getting to Step 6 for the 
following reasons: Calvin K. Sudweeks filed his grievance on July 18, 1983; 
Jay B. Pitkin filed his grievance on August 2, 1983. Early on, as of October 
27, 1983, both grievances were consolidated pursuant to Section 1.0 of the 
Board's rules, due to similar wording and the essential issue being identical 
in both cases. 
For a period the appeal was placed in abeyance from September 20 through 
October 7, 1983, while salary survey data were being gathered by DPM. A Step 
5 hearing was requested on October 19, 1983 by Mr. Pitkin. The Board's 
Executive Secretary scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 14, which 
was continued per request to December 5, continued again to January 16, 1984, 
with an additional continuance requested thereafter. Both parties1 counsel 
had by now requested continuances- Therefore, the Executive Secretary 
continued the hearing but without setting another specific hearing date. 
Respondents' counsel requested subpoenas for the taking of depositions on 
-January 16 from John Gisler, Director, DPM and Robert Haywood, Personnel 
Manager, Department of Health ("Department"). Following the taking of 
depositions, the Step 5 hearing was re-scheduled for and held on March 5, 
1984. The Hearing Officer subsequently issued his Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision on March 22. 
A timely appeal by the Division was made on April 12. Also, the Agency 
requested a Remand Session before the Hearing Officer. A Remand Session was 
then scheduled for May 7. However, in a letter under date of April 18, 
Respondents1 counsel expressed his interest in resisting a remand depending 
upon which issues the Division desired to have clarified by the Hearing 
Officer. Subsequently, on May 1, Respondents1 counsel submitted a formal 
request to deny a Remand Session before the Hearing Officer, even suggesting 
placing of oral arguments before the Executive Secretary on this procedural 
aspect. Additionally, Respondents1 counsel's letter provided six compelling 
reasons for not remanding the Step 5 decision to the Hearing Officer for 
clarification purposes, as requested by the Division* 
Effective May 7, the Executive Secretary re-designated the then-scheduled 
Remand Session as a "Clarification Conference" which was to be conducted off 
the record. This change in format provided the Division with an informal 
opportunity to receive clarification and to make inquiry anent the Step 5 
decision, but allowed the original Step 5 decision to remain intact, as 
desired by the Respondents. Following the May 7 Clarification Conference the 
Agency pursued its previously-initiated appeal to Step 6. The main transcript 
was produced after several weeks. After delivery of the transcript, 
Appellant's counsel requested a three-day extension in filing his brief. 
Respondents* counsel also delayed in submitting his brief. After briefs were 
received by August 16 and mailed to Board members, the Step 6 appeal hearing 
was then scheduled for and held on August 31, with deliberation concluded on 
October 10. 
The above summary accounts for the longer-than-usual lapse of time in 
processing Messrs. Pitkinfs and Sudweeksr appeal to the Board. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The following is a synopsis of events which gave rise to the present 
appeal. 
Effective September 19, 1981 Mr, Pitkin received a two-grade salary 
increase (Grade 27 Step 11 to Grade 29 Step 11) with his new position title of 
Assistant Bureau Director, In November, 1981 Pitkin received a one-step 
increase which placed him at 29/12. Also, on the fourteenth of that same 
month, Don Ostler, a subordinate Section Chief, received a salary increase 
from Grade 27 Step 11 to 27/15 through the support of the Department's 
Executive Director, Dr. James 0. Mason. 
Ostler was attracted to the prospect of self-employment. In order to 
retain Ostler's services for the State, Dr. Mason obtained approval from DPM 
Director John Gisler to increase Ostler's salary by four steps, even though 
this extended Ostler's salary beyond the official pay plan by three steps. 
Ostler's salary at 27/15 (extended range) now equalled Pitkin's at 29/12. One 
year later, specifically on November 13, 1982, Ostler received a one-step 
increase to 27/16, presumably an annual performance step increase, which 
caused his salary to then exceed that of Mr. Pitkin's. 
There matters rested until February 4, 1983 when Fred Pehrson, another of 
the four Section Chiefs subordinate to Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks, submitted 
a formal grievance. Pehrsonfs gravamen focused on management's failure to 
recognize his increased administrative duties for which he had not been fully 
compensated during the past two years; and, additionally, no salary 
differential existed between Perhson's salary and that of his subordinates who 
were also at Grade 27, averred Pehrson. 
After Pehrsonfs grievance progressed through Step 4 without resolution, 
the Board's Executive Secretary applied the then just-enacted 1983 legislation 
to create a special Classification Appeals Panel("Panel") to determine the 
proper classification for Pehrson!s position. On May 11, 1983 the panel 
issued its unanimous findings and recommendations. The Hearing Officer took 
note of and quoted a portion of the panel's "Determinations" in his Step 5 
Decision, pp.3-4. Thus, Pehrson's salary was increased from Grade 27/12 to 
27/15. Also the other three Section Chiefs — Ostler, Reichert and Hinshaw — 
received salary increases to 27/18, 27/10 and 27/13 respectively. 
Implementation of the aforementioned salary increases, through extending the 
range as opposed to advancing the grade level, generated the present 
grievances by Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks who each asserted that the Section 
Chiefs' grade levels should have been increased, rather than their salary 
ranges being extended. 
ISSUE: 
Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks each submitted separate grievance statements 
which contained similar but not identical wording. While Sudweeks referred to 
"serious" salary inequities, Pitkin wrote of "significant" salary inequities. 
Both gentlemen stated their respective opinion that it was inappropriate for 
Department management to have extended the salary range of subordinate Bureau 
Program Managers (previously designated as "Section Chiefs") through step 
increments in lieu of placement on higher salary grades* As director of the 
Water Pollution Control Bureau, Mr. Sudweeks noted that the salary of one of 
his subordinate Program Managers had recently been adjusted to where it not 
only exceeded his own but, in fact, had become equivalent to the highest step 
of his own Bureau Director position's grade. Similarly, Mr. Pitkin, as 
Assistant Bureau Director, observed that another Program Manager's salary now 
exceeded his own, which was then at the highest step of his (Pitkin's) 
position's grade. 
Essentially, both gentlemen complained that subordinate Program Managers' 
salaries now equalled or exceeded their respective salaries. 
Both Manager-Respondents stated that the proper remedy to correct this 
perceived salary inequity should be an appropriate salary adjustment to their 
own salaries. 
Due to the similarity of Messrs. Pitkin's and Sudweek's gravamen, the 
respective grievances were consolidated into one appeal prior to Step 5 with 
the following issue/question then being placed before the Hearing Officer for 
determination: 
Have the Appellants [i.e., Pitkin and Sudweeks] 
been subjected to a serious salary inequity as 
the result of a salary adjustment to a 
subordinate Program Manager in the Bureau of 
Water Pollution Control? 
And, 
If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer concluded in the affirmative 
that Respondents had been subjected to a serious salary inequity and that the 
proper remedy was to award them each a two-step salary increase retroactive to 
April 12, 1983. An added proviso by the Hearing Officer was that these two 
steps would remain in effect only until the implementation of a 
then-forthcoming "Engineering Classification Compensation Study" which was to 
be promulgated by DPM on or after March 28, 1984. 
DISCUSSION: 
When Don Ostler received a one-time, 4-step salary increase from Grade 27 
Step 11 to 27/15 a two-fold, unprecedented action occurred: Preferential 
treatment began in the form of a salary increase of four steps at one time 
(whereas one or two steps are permissible); and second, Ostler was permitted 
to exceed the State pay plan's maximum step for his grade by an additional 
three steps. That matter is not justiciable but it is troubling along with 
being unprecedented. Further, the four-step-at-one-time-action is vexing 
because the salary increase went only to one person (Ostler) — as a special 
concession, outside the ambit of the rules and regulations — rather than to a 
class of positions (Section Chiefs) — and because the action was later 
replicated in the case of Pehrson1s grievance wherein the Department chose to 
increase Pehrson's salary by three steps, with Hinshaw, Reichert and Ostler 
each receiving two steps, rather than raising their grade from 27 to 29. Of 
those four Section Chiefs, three were in extended salary ranges which exceeded 
the maximum: Ostler at 18; Hinshaw at 13, and Pehrson at 15. Notwithstanding 
Exh. R-2 (Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-12), neither the statute nor the DPM 
rules provided for instances where the authorized State pay plan may be 
exceeded. Hence the unusual precedent which began when Ostler received his 
4-step increase in 1981 through the extension of his salary range from Step 11 
to 15, continued as he progressed to 16, and finally to Step 18. Concededly, 
if Ostler had not been reclassified to Grade 30 on October 1, 1983, he might 
now be continuing to progress toward Step 24 or further. Such individualized 
preferential salary treatment may appear to provide fiscal flexibility to 
retain valuable employees for the State, but such an action does not comport 
with a merit system structure where all State employees are to be treated 
according to established rules. When an employee (as opposed to a class or 
classes of positions such as those described in the Board*s USH Local #50 
Decision), receives what appears to be preferential treatment, there is at 
least the suggestion of favoritism ~ whether warranted or not. 
The statute states that "the waiting periods between steps shall be the 
same for all grades." (Section 67-19-12(c)) Such language appears to take 
preference over DPM rule 2.c.(l)(1983 ed.) which states in part: "The 
Director may authorize special exceptions to provisions of these rules when 
permitted by law . . . ." Ostler was treated differently from the other 
Section Chiefs and from Pitkin and Sudweeks anent the waiting period between 
steps, Mr. Gisler testified that subordinates might receive more salary 
(i.e., annual) than their supervisors based upon any one of three factors: 
(1) seniority/longevity, (2) individual performance, or (3) labor market 
conditions- (Gisler T. pp. 4-6) Items 1 and 2 were not used to justify 
OstlerTs 4-step increase. And if item 3 justified Ostlerfs 4-step increase 
then those others in the same class of position (Section Chiefs Hinshaw, 
Pehrson and Reichert) should have received step increases also. Instead, 
Ostler was treated individually and preferentially. 
Because reclassification of all the Department's Engineering position 
titles and grades occurred effective October 1, 1983, which subsequently 
advanced the four Section Chiefs to Grade 30, Pitkin to Grade 32 and Sudweeks 
to Grade 33, the propriety of Ostler, Pehrson and Hinshaw previously exceeding 
the pay plan's maximum limit is now mooted. However, it is a highly 
questionable practice for DPM to exceed the Legislatively-approved pay plan on 
the basis of individualized, preferential treatment rather than on the basis 
of classification and/or authenticated salary data. 
Counsel for Respondents has urged that some consideration be given to 
Messrs. Pitkin's and Sudweek's commendable job performances. The Hearing 
Officer, for example, stated in Finding of Fact No. 7: "In spite of the fact 
that Director Sudweeks has received Outstanding1 performance reviews annually 
over the past many years, he has received only one salary step increase in the 
last six and a half years." Respondents1 counsel stated in his brief (p.2) 
that Sudweeks and Pitkin "are outstanding employees with virtually perfect 
performance evaluations for every performance period of their entire 
careers." However, the basis of this appeal does not rest upon job 
performance as a critical factor, nor even as a relevant one. The Panel 
determined that Section Chief Pehrson had been inaccurately classified for 
approximately two years, that he should have been at a "supervisory 
classification level," which should have translated to "approximately 10% 
higher than the working level [Engineer] grade 27 position . . . ." Hence, 
the threshold issue is one of proper classification and its corresponding 
salary level — not job performance. Albeit, the Board agrees with 
Respondents in that grades of Section Chiefs — not step or range extensions 
— should have been adjusted pursuant to the Pehrson classification Panel !s 
determination; job performance, however, is not a factor of any consequence in 
this appeal, DPM has had rules in place for the past few years which provide 
for regular salary increases based upon annual performance appraisals for 
standard or above standard performances. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The Hearing Officer determined that, "The [Respondents] have been 
subjected to a serious inequity as a result of a salary adjustment to a 
subordinate Program Manager in the Bureau of Water Pollution Control," The 
Hearing Officer thus concluded that Pitkin and Sudweeks are entitled, "as a 
matter of equity," (Decision, p. 5) to the same two-step salary increase 
consideration which was given to the four Section Chiefs who were reclassified 
to Program Managers. (Emphasis added.) Appellant's counsel is correct in 
stating that the Hearing Officer lacked a "legal basis" on which to rule in 
favor of the Manager-Respondents. The Board finds that the Hearing Officer's 
rationale of a two-step increase for Respondents, based upon "a matter of 
equity," is unwarranted and hereby vacates the Step 5 determination. 
A decision which orders a two-step salary adjustment to direct-line 
supervisors predicated soley upon a rationale premised on "a matter of equity" 
is unwarranted in the instant case by the facts. Reclassification of State 
employees is a rather common occurrence. Had the four Section Chiefs been 
reclassified downwards, that would not be grounds for the Hearing Officer to 
reason that the two Manager-Respondents should also be correspondingly 
downgraded. Therefore, whether the four subordinates were reclassified up or 
down in grade level does not constitute a sufficient nexus to similarly adjust 
the salaries of their supervisors, Pitkin and Sudweeks; at least not on the 
grounds of so-called "equity". Equity in the legal meaning denotes "the 
spirit and habit of fairness, justice and right dealing which would regulate 
the intercourse of men with men." (Black's Law Dictionary , p. 484, 5th ed.) 
Equity alone, however, is not a controlling principle upon which employment 
relations' remedies are conditioned. 
More Importantly, the Panel's Pehrson determination was that Pehrson (and 
by association the other three Bureau Section Chiefs) had "been 
inappropriately classified" for at least two years and therefore the Panel set 
a new, appropriate classification title and grade level, that of Program 
Manager, Grade 29 (which was to be applied until DPM's salary survey results 
took effect on October 1, 1983). The Pehrson matter, then, was not merely a 
salary adjustment but comprised a reclassification action which encompassed a 
salary adjustment. Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks are not entitled to a salary 
adjustment merely because their subordinates received one. They must show 
that they were improperly classified when they commenced their grievances. 
The threshold issue is classification, not preferential salary adjustments nor 
even "equity" adjustments. 
The roots of this appeal have their beginnings in the various Department, 
Division and Bureau organizational studies, proposals and recommendations for 
structural reorganization and reclassification, especially including the 
Department's Blue Ribbon Reorganization Committee's report of 1980. Exh. A-3 
relates some past efforts to treat the dual problems of organizational 
structure and classification within the Department, the Division and the 
Bureau. That material has probity value in showing that classification and 
organizational structure problems existed within the Water Pollution Bureau 
long before Sudweeks and Pitkin, or even Pehrson, initiated their respective 
grievances. 
It is rather deplorable that not until the advent of the grievances of 
Pehrson, Pitkin and Sudweeks were DPM and the Department sufficiently 
motivated (or provoked) into resolving the quite longstanding problems of 
structural organization, classification and compensation within the Division 
of Environmental Health. 
The Pehrson Panel observed that the classification specifications for 
Public Health Engineers, Grades 21-27, were outdated by eleven to twelve years 
as of May, 1983• Consequently the Panel recommended that the Department in 
cooperation with DPM "conduct a full scale classification study and salary 
survey" of the entire Division, thus including the Water Pollution Bureau. 
The Panel found that Pehrson had been misclassified for some two years at the 
"working level" of Public Health Engineer, 27, instead of at the "supervisory 
classification level", which, stated the Panel, should have an approximate ten 
percent higher salary range for "Chief Section," (now known as Program 
Manager) above the "working level"* 
That Panel specifically recommended an upgrade from 27 to 29, Steps 1-12 
(or, alternatively, Grade 27, steps 4-16). In addition to Pehrson's pay range 
adjustment effective May 14, 1983, the Panel specifically conditioned the 
alternative (Grade 27/4-16) so that "no employees will be paid beyond the top 
step of the new range" after October 1, 1983. 
Considerable weight must be given to Exh. R-l. That document, entitled 
"Engineering Classification and Compensation Study", resulted from joint 
studies by DPM and the Departments of Health, Natural Resources and 
Transportation. Said document proposed the reclassification of Director, 
Environmental Health, Grade 31 (i.e., Sudweeks as Bureau Director) to 
Engineering Manager III, Grade 32, and Assistant Director, Environmental 
Health, Grade 29 (i.e., Pitkin as Assistant Bureau Director) to Engineering 
Manager II, Grade 31. Subsequently, that memo was revised to where 
Engineering Manager III was assigned to Grade 33 (Sudweeks) and Engineering 
Manager II (Pitkin) was placed at Grade 32, Appellant's brief (p.13) notes 
that Messrs. Sudweeks and Pitkin have undergone little, if any, changes in 
actual duties and responsibilities either before, during, or after submission 
of their grievances. DPM and the Department ultimately reclassified the two 
Manager-Respondents to Grades 32/8 and 33/8 retroactive to October 1, 1983. 
Therefore it is concluded that Respondents1 job duties and responsibilites 
were substantially the same as of October 1, 1983 (the date of the 
Department's aforementioned reclassification implementation), as they were at 
the time of the grievances being filed, July 18 and August 2, 1983. Hence, if 
their compensation level was 33/8 (Sudweeks) and 32/8 (Pitkin) as of October 
1, it should have been the same as of July 18 (for Sudweeks) and August 2 (for 
Pitkin) and they are entitled to be compensated at those respective levels 
retroactively to the dates of filing their respective grievances. 
The Board can only take notice of misclassification situations from the 
date of a grievance being filed. 
The Respondents are found to have been improperly classified between the 
dates of their respective grievances (Pitkin/August 2, 1983; Sudweeks/July 18, 
1983) and October 1, 1983 when the Department implemented the aforementioned 
Engineering Manager class titles and grade levels. Therefore, Messrs. Pitkin 
and Sudweeks are entitled to a compensation adjustment from the date of their 
respective grievances through September 30, 1983. The amount for Mr. Pitkin 
and Mr. Sudweeks is to be based on the difference of what they would have 
earned if they had been properly classified at Grades 32/8 and 33/8 
respectively and what they actually earned at Grades 29/12 and 31/11 during 
the just-described period. 
In conclusion, the Department would have acted more wisely in considering 
existing State policies touching employee bonus plans and incentive awards in 
attempting to retain Ostler's services in 1981 than by exceeding the State's 
established pay plan to selectively benefit a single employee. Second, the 
Department exercised poor judgement in extending the Grade 27 range for the 
four Program Managers instead of adjusting to Grade 29 and placing them at the 
"supervisory level" in the classification/compensation structure pursuant to 
the Pehrson Panel's determination. Exceeding the established steps beyond the 
pay plan does not comport with the spirit of the State!s merit program. 
Third, both parties have admitted that there are acceptable situations in 
which subordinates receive higher salary than their superiors. Although the 
parties both affirmatively argued that issue against each other, essentially 
they agreed in principle that rare situations can and do exist where 
subordinates may reasonably and properly receive a higher salary than their 
supervisors, as based upon justifiable reasons. That issue is now 
well-settled. Finally, there is the question of precedence and its ongoing 
effect. Appellant's counsel has hinted that the logical conclusion of the 
Hearing Officer's "equity" rationale would be that "every time a subordinate 
is given any kind of increase, his superior must be granted a similar 
increase." (Brief, p.17) If applied literally, that would be undesirable, 
perhaps even chaotic. Certainly such an impact would severely hamper State 
management's interest in maintaining ongoing efforts to promote an accurate 
classification program. However, as noted previously, the Hearing Officer's 
rationale of "equity" salary adjustments is not persuasive. When subordinates 
are reclassified, to the extent that grade compaction and salary compression 
result (as it did in this case because of the Pehrson Panel's findings), then 
State management is well advised to fully assess those impacts on the working 
level relationships between subordinates and supervisors who occupy positions 
in the same class series. In conclusion, the facts and circumstances of this 
particular appeal are such that little, if any, precedence would apply to 
other non-related cases. 
DECISION: 
The Step 5 decision is vacated as to Conclusion B and the Hearing 
Officer's remedy. In place thereof, the Board sets forth its own conclusions 
and remedy as described in the foregoing "Conclusions". 
DATED this j^U day of ^  X^Z^J^^X^ , 1984. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Peter Fillmore, 
Acting Chairman 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
Robert N. White 
Executive Secretary 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days 
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County. 
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. 67-19-25(6), 1953, 
as amended. 
Exhibit I 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
A. PAUL LUND, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
v. 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
D E C I S I O N 
Case No. 3 PRB 24 
The above-entitled matter came before the Utah Personnel Review Board 
("Board") as an appeal hearing, pursuant to notice, on August A, 1987 in the 
Governor's Board Room, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
following Board members were present: Bruce T. Jones, Chairman; Jean M. 
Bishop, David M. Hilbig, and Jose L. Trujillo. 
The Division of Health Care Financing was represented by Robert Haywood, 
Personnel Manger, Bureau of Personnel, Department of Health ("Department"). 
A. Paul Lund, originally the grievant at the Step 5 or evidentiary level, was 
the respondent at the appellate level. Mr. Lund represented himself in a pro 
se capacity. The Division of Health Care Financing ("Division") in the role 
of appellant advanced the case to the Board at Step 6 of the State1s Grievance 
Procedure. 
A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before the 
Board, which, to date, has not been transcribed. However, the court 
reporter's record from the Step 5 or evidentiary level was transcribed into a 
one volume transcript. That transcript was made available to the parties for 
the purpose of submitting briefs to the Board and for use in making oral 
argument at the appeal hearing. 
1. 
This case came properly before the Utah Personnel Review Board which has 
jurisdiction over the matter on appeal. The Board1s statutory authority is 
found within the State Personnel Management Act, expecially Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, sections 67-19-20 through 25. Therein the Board's 
authority and appellate jurisdiction are defined. The Board's regulatory 
provisions have been enacted administratively and promulgated as the Grievance 
Procedure Rules (1987 ed.)-
Following oral argument before the Board on August 4, the matter was taken 
under advisement, and thereafter considered in an executive session. Being 
duly apprised in the facts, rules, and matters of law pertaining to the issues 
and premises of the case, the Board now makes and enters the following 
findings, conclusions, and decision: 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This matter proceeded regularly through the State employees' Grievance 
Procedure. At the evidentiary or Step 5 level, a Board hearing officer, 
serving pro tempore, sustained the grievance of A. Paul Lund ("Grievant") and 
awarded him two separate retroactive salary step increases. The Board 
reverses and vacates that decision. 
A. The Grievance. 
A. Paul Lund filed a grievance statement under date of February 17, 1987. 
His grievance stated: 
On 2/21/87 a new surveyor was hired on our team. She is a 
social worker (CSW) like myself and she is a Qualified 
Mental Retardation Professional (QMRP) like myself. It is 
my responsibility to train this person in her duties. I 
have been at classification 23 step 2. The new QMRP was 
hired at classification 23 step 4. 
2. 
Grievant1s requested remedy sought the following: "I am seeking a minimum 
3 step increase in my 23 classification." 
Essentially Mr. Lund's complaint involved two issues. The first issue 
concerns the hiring of a QMRP at grade 23 step 4 subsequent to Mr. Lund being 
hired at grade 23 step 1 (thereafter advancing to step 2 following completion 
of probation). The result.of the difference in hiring salary rates was that 
the more recently hired QMRP was being paid two steps above the Grievant, even 
though she had been hired nearly eighteen months after the Grievant!s hiring. 
The second issue is that Mr. Lund should have received a two-step increase 
based upon an outstanding performance appraisal given to him. As he stated in 
a March 2, 1987 letter to his division director: "On February 1986 I received 
an outstanding annual evaluation which would merit a two-step increase in pay, 
but was denied such because of the salary freeze." Thereafter both 
issues—the differentiation in the hiring rates between A. Paul Lund and Helen 
Middleton (with whom he chose to compare salaries) and the award of only a 
one-step increase following completion of a probationary term, rather than two 
steps—were each presented as part of his grievance and responded to at steps 
4 and 5 by the Division, together with no step increase being awarded during 
February of FY 86-87. 
B. Grievant1s Employment History. 
On August 26, 1985 Mr. Lund was hired as a Health Program Surveyor with 
the Facility Survey Section, a unit within the Bureau of Medical Review, 
Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of Health. Grievant 
commenced employment at grade 23 step 1. Upon completion of a standard six 
months1 probationary period, Grievant received a one-step salary increase. 
For the period from November 26, 1985 through February 1986, Grievant was 
evaluated as being "Above Standard." (Mgt. Exh.5.) One year later Mr. Lund 
was again evaluated in February 1987. He was then rated for the period from 
January 26, 1986 to February 25, 1987 as an "Outstanding" employee. (Mgt. Exh. 
3. 
6.) Personnel Management Rules ("PPM Rules") for FY 86-87 precluded any 
salary increases for productivity or performance during that year. (PPM 
Rules, section 7.d.(l)(a).) Grievant remained at step 2 of grade 23 in 
February 1987, which caused him to initiate his grievance upon learning that 
Ms. Middleton had been hired two steps above his salary rate despite his 
longer service by eighteen months. 
C. Issues. 
The hearing officer at the Step 5 adjudicative proceeding determined the 
issues to be two-fold: 
1. Whether the Grievant has been improperly denied a 
three-step salary increase or not? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
The appropriate evidentiary standard of review at Step 5 was that of 
substantial evidence, which is also the standard used by the Board in its 
review. Essentially, the Board must determine whether the hearing officer 
made correct findings of fact, whether those facts have been correctly applied 
to the law, and whether the Step 5 conclusions of law and decision are 
accurate and correct based on the facts. In the instant case, the Board, 
after reviewing the record finds that the hearing officer's Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision ("Step 5 Decision") critically erred in three 
of the four Conclusions in the Decision. These errors are of sufficient 
magnitude as to constitute reversible error. 
II, 
ANALYSIS OF THE STEP 5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Conclusion No. 1. 
Conclusion No. 1 in the Step 5 Decision states: 
H. Middleton!s recent hiring is irrelevant to Lundfs 
grievance. Whatever irregularities in hiring her 
that may have occurred should be addressed in some 
other way than the scope of this decision. 
This conclusion is correct: The hiring of Middleton at salary step 4 is 
not related to whether the former applicable personnel rules had been properly 
applied to Mr. Lund anent his hiring rate, his subsequent salary increase, or 
any lack of salary increase. Mr. Lund does not have a valid cause of action 
simply because another employee was hired at a later date and at a higher rate 
when the then existing rules permitted such. 
PPM Rule 7.c.(2) (effective July 1, 1985) applied to Mr. Lund when he was 
hired in August 1985. The rule stated: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the first step of 
the approved range. Hiring above the first step of the 
approved range may be permitted by the Director [of DMP] 
only under unique conditions with documentation. 
The implementation of the just-stated rule caused no harm to Mr. Lund—he 
was hired according to a salary policy established by a lawfully promulgated 
rule in force at the time of his hire. 
In contrast, when Ms. Middleton was hired PPM Rule 7.c.(2) (effective July 
1, 1986) had been amended to read: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the first step of 
the approved range. In the spirit of providing services to 
agencies and allowing management to manage human resources 
within their budget, agencies will have full responsibility 
and authority to hire up to midpoint of the approved range 
with the understanding the department head is held 
responsible for providing funding and for preventing 
inequities. (PPM Rule, section 7.c.(2), effective July 1, 
1986.) 
Thus DPM permitted different salary rates when Mr. Lund and Ms. Middleton 
were each hired. Each was hired pursuant to the rule in force at the time of 
his or her hiring. Grievant was not harmed even though the rules permitted a 
distinction of hiring rates. 
Conclusion No, 2. 
The hearing officer's second conclusion reads: 
The confusion over what was or was not agency and state 
policy on extra-step "productivity" increases by 
supervisors Simpson, Elkins, and Lamanna, and the obvious 
confusion engendered by M.S.C. Gatzemeyer's directive, 
coupled with disparate treatment of Lund (under similar 
circumstances), compared to employees in other units and 
divisions by the Health Department by other supervisors, 
suggests Lund was treated unfairly, arbitrarily and 
capriciously. The Hearing Officer finds overwhelming 
substantial evidence exists. 
Beginning with Conclusion No. 2 the trier of facts has not accurately 
applied the law, as based upon the given factual situation; and three 
erroneous conclusions of law resulted. The Step 5 Decision penalizes Divison 
management for failing to award Grievant a two-step increase in February 
1986. The hearing officer opines that both "confusion" and "obvious 
confusion" caused the Grievant not to receive an extra step increase in 
February 1986. However, the responsibility of the finder of facts is to 
accurately apply the applicable rules and law, which were in force during the 
designated period, to the factual circumstances. The applicable rule in force 
when Grievant received his end of probation performance evaluation and 
resultant salary increase was rule 7.d.(l)(b) of Personnel Management Rules 
and Regulations, effective July 1, 1985. (See Mgt. Exh. 7.) The pertinent 
provision of that rule states: 
New employees shall serve a probationary period ranging 
from six months to eighteen months depending on the class 
of position. A one or two step increase may be granted to 
employees successfully completing six months of probation . 
. . .(Emphasis added.) 
6. 
In the above-quoted rule, agency management is granted discretion to award 
either a one or two step salary increase. The just-quoted rule allowed 
agency management to determine the number of step increases, either one or 
two. Moreover, the wording specifies "may be granted." Thus the granting of 
such a salary increase is entirely discretionary. Not only may either one or 
two steps be given, but a careful reading of the rule quoted above allows for 
situations where no increases need be offered. Step increases were not even 
required to be given due to the discretionary language of rule 7.d.(l)(b) 
(1985 ed.). It is the Board's determination that the receipt by Lund of only 
a one-step increase, pursuant to PPM Rules 7.d.(l)(b) (1985 ed.), does not 
necessarily or reasonably lead to the legal conclusion that he was "treated 
unfairly, arbitrarily and capriciously" based on the factual findings. 
The PPM Rules in force at the time of Mr. Lund1s probationary period 
allowed agency management to consider its personal services budget and to 
determine whether sufficient funds existed to grant one step increases, two 
steps, or none. Even within a fiscal year, an imposed budget reduction might 
find employees later in the fiscal year not receiving an increase that had 
earlier been given to employees prior to an agency's fiscal reduction. 
Conceivably some divisions might choose to grant only one-step increases, 
awarding no two-step increases. The rule does not require all similarly 
situated probationary emnployees to be treated equally or identically. We 
believe this to be intentional. Even if other employees in other divisions or 
units of the Health Department received two-step awards, that does not require 
the Health Care Financing Division to do likewise, unless directed to do so by 
senior management. Concededly, there may also be other units within the 
Division that might possess funding for two-step increases, and so grant 
them. In addition to the availability of funding, other business necessity 
factors might well control or justify the specific number of steps (or none) 
to be awarded. The exercise of the discretion inherent in the wording of the 
applicable rules does not constitute sufficient grounds for the conclusion 
that Mr. Lund's treatment was arbitrary and capricious. The record contains 
sufficient facts upon which a reasonable person could base the hiring and 
7. 
salary decisions made in this case.Mr. Lund was not harmed as a result of 
receiving only a one-step increase when the then existing PPM Rules provided 
for such. There was no violation of a personnel rule with respect to Mr. Lund 
receiving a one-step increase at the end of his probation, instead of two 
steps where PPM Rules 7.d.(l) (b) provided managerial discretion to authorize 
zero, one, or two steps, upon completion of probation. It was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious to award Mr. Lund only one step in February 1986, in 
light of the above-cited rules and circumstances. 
Conclusion No. 3. 
Conclusion No. 3 mistakenly concludes: 
The policy of the Pepartment of Health was not clearly and 
consistently enunciated to Lund!s supervisors in 1986 and 
1987. This led to his supervisors not vigorously 
championing extra-step increases, which would "almost 
certainly have been supported by the Bureau of Personnel" 
staff if such extra-step requests had been timely submitted 
with justification. The justification was clearly 
adequate, more than adequate, in Lund's case according to 
testimony. 
The above-quoted conclusion stands in error for the following reasons. 
First, it was the "policy" (i.e. , rule) of the State expressed through PPM 
Rules 7.d.(l)(b) that some discretion existed with respect to the number of 
step increases awarded at the end of probation. If the HCF Pivision 
determined to limit such increases to one step that is not necessarily 
arbitrary, capricious or even unfair if some reasonable basis exists for such 
a decision. The hearing officer has incorrectly substituted his own judgment 
when the applicable rule allows agency descretion. Piscretion was division 
management's prerogative so long as there is present some reasonable basis so 
that application of the rule is found not to be arbitrary or capricious. 
It should also be noted that if Mr. Lund objected to receiving a one-step 
increase instead of two steps, his recourse was to then utilize the 
Grievance Procedure. If he thought it to be unfair or in violation of the 
8. 
personnel rules to receive only a one-step salary increase, he should have 
timely grieved the matter. Mr. Lund would have found out either on or shortly 
after February 18, 1986 that he was going to be receiving only a one-step 
increase, not two. Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-24 states: 
1. No appeal shall be sumitted under this chapter unless 
(a) it is submitted within 20 working days after the event 
giving rise to the appeal or (b) within 20 working days 
after the aggrieved employee has knowledge of the event 
giving rise to the appeal. 
2. Notwithstanding subsection (l)(b), no employee may 
submit an appeal more than one year after the event giving 
rise to the appeal, nor does any person who has voluntarily 
terminated his or her employment with the state have any 
standing thereafter to submit an appeal. 
As Mr. Lund had knowledge of the event giving rise to his grievance in 
February 1986, he was untimely to initiate his grievance in February 1987. 
The Step 5 Decision should have, recognized the untimeliness condition, but it 
failed to address that fact. 
The hearing officer also improperly attaches fault on Mr. Lund!s 
supervisors for "not vigorously championing extra-step increases" which would 
"almost certainly have been supported by the Bureau of Personnel." Such a 
statement is wholly speculative and merely hypothetical. It is the role and 
responsibility of the hearing officer to make verifiable findings and legal 
conclusions. It is reversible error to render a decision based upon 
speculation of what might have occurred in other circumstances. The hearing 
officer should not attempt to second-guess agency management, as to what 
course or decision management would take in an alternative situation, given 
other circumstances. 
Conclusion No. 4. 
The fourth and final conclusion of the Step 5 Decision states: 
9. 
The granting of these retroactive two-step increases is not 
to be a precedent in any other case where inequities 
between salaries of new hires and incumbents exist—this 
decision is based solely and exclusively upon confusion 
over policy by supervisors in this one specific case and 
the resulting inequitable treatment of Lund. He was 
penalized because of managerial mistakes. 
In this conclusion, the hearing examiner concludes that Lund "was 
penalized because of managerial mistakes," due "exclusively upon confusion 
over policy by supervisors" with "resulting inequitable treatment of Lund." 
First it must be realized that Lund was not penalized by managerial 
mistakes when first-line supervisors supported a two-step increase but 
division management later restricted that increase to a one-step increase. 
The hearing examiner failed to give proper weight or even to consider the then 
existant PPM Rules 7.d. (l)(a), which states in pertinent part: 
Productivity increases (reflective of the natural increase 
in capability that occurs as employees learn their jobs) of 
one or two steps shall be granted on an annual basis 
following a six month probationary increase of one or two 
steps until the market rate (midpoint of the salary range) 
for the class has been achieved . . . .(Emphasis added). 
Division management, as represented by Steven Gatzemeyer, Management 
Services Coordinator, was holding probationary employees like Mr. Lund to a 
one-step increase. That discretionary act was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. It was a Division policy or practice during FY 85-86 which turned 
out to have effected Mr. Lund. But such a practice did not violate existing 
PPM Rules. 
Conclusion No. A invokes a ground that is based primarily upon a human 
value system—the matter of equity. Specifically, the fourth conclusion makes 
reference to "equities between salaries of new hires and incumbents" and the 
alleged "inequitable treatment of Lund." 
10. 
The proper rules and laws must be carefully applied in the adjudications 
at Step 5 hearings* When and if cases are determined on the basis of "equity" 
alone, they may not be dispositive to legally sound or logically reasoned 
decision-making. That principle was fixed in the previous case of Division of 
Environmental Health vs. Jay B. Pitkin and Calvin K. Sudweeks (2 PRB 15, 
1984). In the just-cited case another hearing officer concluded that two 
Health Department managers .were entitled to a two-step salary increase ffas a 
matter of equity." (Ibid, p.8). In Pitkin we stated: "The Board finds that 
the Hearing Officer's rationale of a two-step increase for Respondents, based 
upon a 'matter of equity' is unwarranted . . . ." and vacated the Step 5 
decision. Pitkin stated the Board's position on salary equity disputes in the 
following words: 
Equity in the legal meaning denotes 'the spirit and habit 
of fairness, justice and right dealing which would regulate 
the intercourse of men with men. (Black's Law Dictionary, 
p. 484, 5th ed.) Equity alone, however, is not a 
controlling principle upon which employment relations' 
remedies are conditioned. (Ibid.) 
Admittedly there will likely always exist salary inequities for some 
employees given the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring 
practices, its change in philosophies by different administrations and 
department executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel rules in 
order to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other germane 
reasons that need not be included herein. 
With respect to the assertion that the two-step increase would not be a 
precedent, it is not necessary for the Board to determine the consequences of 
such a decision because there are sufficient other grounds present to reverse 
the decision. 
However it can be noted that in attempting to resolve Mr. Lund's 
complaint, the hearing officer would create an inequity of great magnitude. 
The role of the hearing officer is to resolve grievances but in so doing he 
must not impose his own variety of arbitrariness nor create inequities of his 
own making. 
11. 
I n conclusion, the Board commends Mr. Lund f o r being recognized as an 
outstanding and h igh ly valued State employee by h is immediate superv isors . We 
wish Mr. Lund t o understand tha t the Board's decis ion has been rendered only 
on the basis of appl icable conclusions of law, and i s not r e l a ted t o Mr. 
Lund's past or present job performance — which was repor ted t o be of good 
qua l i t y . No par t of t h i s decis ion should be viewed as de t rac t ing i n any way 
from Mr. Lund's f i n e record. 
DECISION: 
The Division's appeal is affirmed. The Hearing Officer's determination in 
the Step 5 Decision is hereby vacated. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
D A T E D t h i s cX ^ day of September, 1987. 
BRUCE T. JOt^ JES, Chairman 
Utah PersonnelReTIew Board 
ROBERT N, WHITE, Administ rator 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
E n c : Mai l ing C e r t i f i c a t e 
Any appeal from the Board's decis ion must be made w i t h i n 20 calendar days 
from issuance o f t h i s dec is ion w i t h the D i s t r i c t Court f o r S a l t Lake County. 
On appeal to D i s t r i c t Court, the Board's f i nd ings of f a c t , i f supported by 
subs tan t ia l evidence, s h a l l be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. Sect ion 
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended. 
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Exhibit J 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
C. C. PATEL, 
Grievant and Appellant, 
v. : 
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL : 
HEALTH, : 
Agency and Respondent. : 
DECISION 
AND 
OPINION 
Case Nos. 9 CSRB/H.O. 
4 CSRB 37 
122 Step 5) 
(Step 6) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level review 
of the above-captioned matter on November 12, 1991. The following Board members were 
present at the hearing for oral argument and deliberation: Bruce T. Jones, Chairman, 
Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig, Kathleen Hirabayashi, and Jose L. Trujillo. C. C. Patel 
(Patel and Appellant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, on 
behalf of the Utah Public Employees' Association. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. 
Schwendiman represented the Division of Environmental Health (Division). Daniel J. Brentel, 
Human Resource Manager, for the Division, was also present. A certified court reporter made 
a verbatim record of the oral argument during this proceeding, which is commonly referred to 
as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Unannotated (Supplement 1991), Sections 67-19a-101 et seq. 
I. AUTHORITY 
The Board's authority is found at Sections 67-19a-101 through -407 of the just-mentioned 
statutes. The CSRB's regulatory provisions or administrative rules are published in the Utah 
Administrative Code at R140-1-1 et seq., and in the Board's Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Manual (1989 edition). 
This case has proceeded properly and timely through the State's grievance procedures, 
and the Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Appellant's appeal to Step 6 of those 
procedures. The Step 6 or Board-level review constitutes the final step and is the highest level 
of administrative review under the codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to 
Sections 67-19a-202(l)(a), and -407, as well as constituting a final agency action under Section 
63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Following oral argument, the Board 
closed the record, and entered into deliberation and decision-making. Being apprised in the facts 
and legal premises, the Board now makes and enters its factual findings, legal conclusions, and 
decision, 
n. ISSUES 
A. Statement of Grievance and Remedy 
Patd filed a statement of grievance on October 26, 1990. That grievance statement is 
quite lengthy; therefore, only the following portions are quoted below. 
I am bringing this action as a salary inequity grievance caused by 
the hiring of a new employee at a salary rate higher than mine as 
a current employee. . . . 
Mr. John Kennington was hired in the Bureau of Water Pollution 
Control, Division of Environmental Health, and started working as 
[a] Level III Engineer on October 15, 1990. It is my 
understanding that Mr. Kennington (new hired) will be making 9% 
highgr salary than mine. I am now making $18.55 per hour as [a] 
Level IV [EJngineer, which is a higher position than Level III 
[Ejngineer. I worked in this Bureau for 7 years as [a] Level III 
Engineer. I was then promoted on May 2, 1988, to [a] Level IV 
Engineer position. I now have worked as [a] level IV Engineer in 
this Bureau for 2 1/2 years. 
Appellant stated the following as the remedy to his October 26, 1990, grievance: 
1. That my salary be adjusted upward by 22% of my current 
salary. 
2. That this adjustment be made retroactive to October 15, 1990, 
which is the hiring date of the new hired [i.e., John Kennington]. 
3. That the ensuring market adjustment in my salary resulting 
from the [D]HRM's market survey be based upon this new salary, 
and 
4. [T]hat this grievance be treated separately from and without 
prejudice to my April 25, 1990 grievance. 
B. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding 
The Notice of an Administrative Hearing Before the Hearing Officer, dated January 17, 
1991, set forth the following two issues to be adjudicated: (1) Is the Grievant [Patel] entitled to 
prevail on his salary issue grievance?, and (2) If so, what is the appropriate remedy? The CSRB 
hearing officer re-worded the first issue in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision 
and Order (Step 5 Decision) as follows: "Does a salary inequity exist between grievant and a 
new hire?" 
C. Step 5/Evidentiary Determination 
The evidentiary trier of facts ultimately determined that Appellant's grievance was 
without merit, and ordered that his grievance be dismissed. From the evidentiary decision 
below, now comes Patel bringing his appeal on the Step 5 Decision to the Board at Step 6 of the 
State's grievance procedure. 
D. The Board's Scope of Review 
R14Q-1-21 D sets forth the Board's scope of review and its standards of review, as 
follows: 
Standards of Review The board's decision shall be based upon the 
following: 
1. The board's appellate decisions shall be supported by credible 
substantial evidence. 
2. The board's standards of review consist of determining: 
(a) whether the hearing officer's evidentiary decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is 
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; 
and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the 
evidence in the record. 
E. Burden of Proof 
Patel is the appealing party in this matter before the Board. Therefore, Patel shoulders 
the burden of proof based upon the Board's just-stated standards of review. 
m . STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Evidentiary Factual Findings 
Neither party has disagreed with nor objected to the hearing officer's findings of fact. 
Hence, those factual findings are adopted and incorporated herein in the same numerical 
sequence, although with some slight change of syntax. 
1. Appellant has been employed by the Division of Environmental Health's Bureau of 
Water Pollution Control1 Bureau for 9,5 years. 
2. Appellant has been classified as an Engineer IV since May 1988. Prior to that Patel 
was an Engineer HI for six years. 
3. Appellant has 20 years' experience as an engineer with ten years' experience as an 
environmental engineer. 
4. Appellant received his BS degree in 1962 in Civil Engineering; a Master's degree in 
Civil Engineering-Hydraulics, in 1967; and a Master's degree in Civil Engineering-Sanitary, in 
1971. 
5. Patel's performance appraisals as an Engineer IV have been rated exceptional. 
6. Patel is the only Engineer IV in the Bureau of Water Pollution Control. 
7. Engineer IVs perform work similar to Engineer Ills except that the former must 
possess a higher level of expertise and competence. An Engineer IV is similar to a lead 
consultant who is able to move from project to project, based upon the stage of complexity of 
the project and when technical expertise is necessary. 
8. As an Engineer IV Patel is expected to perform at a higher level than an Engineer 
HI by performing the following: 
a. Independent research of current technologies in water pollution control; 
b. Evaluate proposals received by management; 
c. Interpret rules and policies for staff; 
d. Keep abreast of trends to update staff; 
e. Assist with proposals being recommended as projects to be undertaken. 
9. On or about October 15, 1990, Kennington was hired as an Engineer III at the Bureau 
of Water Pollution Control, Division of Environmental Health. 
10. Upon being hired, Kennington's base salary was 95% of the maximum salary for 
his pay grade (or pay range). 
11. On October 15, 1990, Kennington earned approximately 9% more than Patel, i.e., 
$20.16 to Patel's $18.55 per hour. 
12. On October 15, 1990, Kennington had less education and less total engineering 
experience than did Patel. Kennington also lacked regulatory agency experience. 
13. Appellant believes that the hiring of an Engineer III with less experience and 
education at a higher pay rate created a salary inequity, and he pursued internal resolution 
through the grievance procedure. 
14. Patel met with Don Ostler, Director of the Bureau of Water Pollution Control. 
Ostler met with Richard McDonald of the Utah Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRM). McDonald, according to Ostler, informed him that, generally, inequities in pay were 
correctable, but only when comparing inequities within the same classification. 
15. Upon Kennington's being hired, a comparison was made of the salaries of all 
Engineer Ills within the [Division]2. A spreadsheet, with information obtained from the 
Division, was generated to remedy any pay inequity that might result from Kennington's higher 
starting pay rate. Only Engineer Ills were considered on the spread sheet, as they were all in 
the same classification. 
16. Kennington was hired at a salary rate above the midpoint of the Engineer III pay 
range after DHRM approved the hiring action by the Division, and after exhaustive recruitment, 
search and attempts to hire a qualified engineer at a lower pay rate. 
17. Robert Haywood, Human Resource Director for the Department of Health [then the 
Division's parent organizational unit], reviewed the register prior to an offer being made to 
Kennington. Haywood telephoned Kennington in an attempt to convince Kennington to work 
for the starting salary of an Engineer III, including benefits plus job security. Kennington 
agreed to begin at a pay rate of $20.16 an hour, rather than $20.43 an hour. Haywood was 
convinced that based upon the limited applicant pool, the experience of Kennington and the 
nonsupervisory responsibility of the position that the offer was reasonable, given the market 
salaries of comparable engineers. 
18. Pursuant to policy, DHRM needed to approve the salary offer to Kennington because 
the offered rate was above midpoint on the pay range. Felix McGowan of DHRM approved the 
hiring offer on August 21, 1990, after he had reviewed all relevant data, including the spread 
sheet comparison of the all Engineer Els in the Bureau. 
19. On or about April 3, 1990, Richard McDonald, Director, Division of Compensation 
and Classification, DHRM, issued a memorandum entitled "Compensation Issues." (See Grvt. 
Exht. 5.) 
20. On or about August 8, 1990, Earl J. Banner, then Executive Director, DHRM, 
wrote to Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director, Department of Health. In correspondence, 
Banner referenced McDonald's memorandum of April 3, 1990, and replied to specific questions 
from Dr. Dandoy regarding pay inequities and special pay adjustments. (See Grvt. Exht. 9.) 
21. Patel affirms that he is not alleging that an inequity in salary exists upon an illegal 
discriminatory hiring practice nor based upon Patel's race, color, national origin, sex, religion, 
creed, age, disability, or his political affiliation. 
B. The Board's Factual Findings 
The Board makes and enters the following findings of fact based upon the record below: 
1. The Division's higher rate of pay offered to Kennington was based upon a rationale 
justification relating to (a) an extremely lengthy recruiting period which began in November 
1989 and ended with Kennington's hiring in October 1990 (RUPP, T. p. I l l ; OSTLER, T. p. 
65; HAYWOOD, T. p. 152-53), (b) all the Engineer III candidates who qualified for the 
position (eventually filled by Kennington) were then earning more money in the private sector 
than what was being offered to any of the candidates for the State position. (RUPP, T. p. 111-
12.) 
2. The Division's final salary offer to Kennington was equal to that being paid to another 
Engineer HI (Tim Pine) who had quite similar qualifications to Kennington's. Of 20 Engineer 
Ills in the Division, three had higher salary rates than Kennington's, 16 were paid at a lesser 
pay rate, with Kennington's pay rate matched to Tim Pine's based upon comparable 
qualifications. (RUPP, T. p. 112; Agency Exht. 7.) 
3. The Division relied upon market data factors to hire Kennington and fill the 
long-standing, vacant Engineer position at a salary of $20.16. The salary offer to Kennington 
was wholly market-driven. (HAYWOOD, T. pp. 150, 161, 164, 165, 169, 192; RUPP, T. pp. 
111-12; McDONALD, T. p. 143-44; CLAWSON, T. p. 210-11; Agency Exht. 7.) 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Board and its hearing officers lack jurisdiction over classification complaints 
pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated §67-19-31(1) and R140-1-1. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over issues and disputes involving wages, salary matters, 
and pay complaints generally, as well as over allegations of violations of personnel rules (§67-
19a-202(l)(a)). 
3. DHRM has sole direct responsibility and authority to design and administer both the 
State's pay plan and the State's classification system (§67-19-8(1) and (2)). These 
responsibilities and functions may not be delegated or contracted to any other State agency. 
4. §67-19-12(3) specifies DHRM's role in establishing the State's position classification 
plan. §67-19-8(4) specifies DHRM's role in developing, adopting, and implementing the State's 
pay plans for all positions in the classified service. 
5. §67-19-6(l)(d) authorizes DHRM to develop, implement and administer aa statewide 
program of personnel management," including the adopting of rules for personnel management 
(§67-19-6(l)(a) and (d)). 
6. The personnel management rules by DHRM which are applicable to this case are 
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1990). 
7. DHRM R468-7-2 broadly allocates all classified positions to one of the State's several 
pay plans: "Each classification of positions [sic] shall be assigned to a salary range on the pay 
plan . . . ." 
8. R468-7-2.(l) states: 
Each classification [of position] shall be assigned [to] a salary 
range which takes into consideration the classification plan, market 
and other data. Market research shall be carried out by DHRM 
through comprehensive labor market surveys and surveys prompted 
by analysis of turnover, vacancy rates and recruitment indicators. 
9. R468-7-3.(2) states: 
Individuals will typically be appointed at the minimum pay [rate] 
of the approved [salary] range. However, agencies have full 
responsibility and authority at their discretion to hire up to [the] 
midpoint of the approved range. Hiring above the minimum [rate] 
of the range shall not be used as justification to increase the salary 
[rates] of current encumbents [sic] [,] except where approved 
market data supports such increases. 
It has not been shown that the just-stated rule was abused or violated by the Division 
inasmuch as none of the 20 Engineer III incumbents had their salary changed as a result of 
Kennington's being hired. 
10. R468-7-2.(l) states that each classification of position takes into consideration salary 
market data, salary surveys, and such relevant hiring information as turnover rates, position 
vacancy rates, and other recruitment factors. Such market conditions may be relevant to justify 
the higher pay rate for a new level III appointee over a longer term level IV incumbent (or in 
comparison to other level Ills). 
11. In Patel's case, a pay differential or pay discrepancy does not necessarily constitute 
a pay equity situation even though a more recently hired employee's pay rate exceeds that of a 
longer service employee (i.e., Patel) provided there is adequate justification and a fully 
supportable rationale that does not offend. Certainly any such justification may not be based 
upon such clearly impermissible factors as race, sex, color, national origin, age (40 years and 
above), religion, or disability. 
12. The pay differential or salary discrepancy between Kennington and Patel does not 
constitute a pay inequity to the latter: (a) where the market conditions require the Division's 
year-long recruiting efforts, (b) where several offers that are extended to other individuals are 
turned down due to higher salary expectations, and (c) where an agency has to offer an 
exceptional above midpoint pay rate—together with the required approval of DHRM--in order 
to fill a critical position with a qualified candidate. These kinds of market condition factors do 
not rise to the level of pay inequity or pay discrimination. 
13. Where a grievant alleges a discriminatory pay practice, the burden of proof is on 
the grievant to compare his or her pay rate with that of the appropriate group for comparison 
purposes. 
14. In the instant matter, Appellant has not shown that his pay rate vis-a-vis 
Kennington's constitutes a pay rate inequity, an unlawful discriminatory pay practice, or an 
improper or abusive pay differential or discrepancy given the facts and circumstances that 
required the Division to rely upon then current salary market data and conditions to set an 
exceptional pay rate for Kennington. The Board further concludes that the Division's reliance 
upon salary market data and conditions is fully supportable, reasonable in the circumstance, and 
wholly justifiable. Therefore, it is not necessary to enter into comparisons between the pay rates 
of Engineer m versus Engineer IV position titles and salary (grade) ranges at this time. 
V. DISCUSSION 
There is no factual dispute regarding the following points: (1) that Kennington as the 
more recently hired employee was employed as an Engineer III, whereas Patel is an Engineer 
IV, (2) that Kennington was hired on the Engineer III salary range but at a rate of nearly 95% 
of that range, (3) that Kennington's pay rate as an Engineer III exceeded Patel's rate as an 
Engineer IV, (4) that Patel generally has more relevant education, work experience, and 
governmental service than Kennington, (5) that Kennington's pay rate at $20.16 is approximately 
nine percent above Patel's rate at $18.55, although Patel presently has the opportunity to reach 
a greater maximum salary rate due to being on a higher salary (grade) range, (6) that Patel avers 
that a pay inequity exists between his salary and Kennington's, (7) that Patel argues against 
making a distinction in position classification (i.e., Engineer III as opposed to Engineer IV), but 
instead avers that the duties and responsibilities of these two incumbents' are so similar that job 
comparability exists between Kennington's and Patel's respective positions, and (8) that the 
Division conducted a spread sheet analysis of all 20 Engineer Ills in the Division (which ranked 
three incumbents at a higher pay rate than Kennington, 16 below him, and one at a matching 
pay rate), although no analysis was performed regarding Patel's pay rate as Engineer IV with 
Kennington's hiring rate as an Engineer III. 
The evidentiary decision of the hearing officer concluded that Patel's grievance lacked 
merit because Patel and Kennington were in different "classifications." The hearing officer 
stated: 
The pay range should reflect equal pay for equal work. (See UCA 
67-19-12(4).) The concept of equal pay for equal work is confined 
to employees within the same classification. Equal pay is not, as 
Mr. Patel argues, a generic concept comparing duties in different 
classifications. Mr. Patel is insured [of] equal pay for equal work 
within his classification. (Emphasis added.) 
The hearing officer further concluded that Engineers at levels I, II, III, and IV comprise a class 
series. Even though Appellant argued below that some State agencies allow equitable salary 
adjustments based upon class series, the Step 5 Decision held that "classification inequity is and 
has been the determining factor for salary adjustments" within this Division. According to the 
CSRB hearing officer, if other departments provide salary adjustments based upon a class series, 
then it is DHRM's (and not this Division's) role to ensure accurate comparisons of class series. 
Thus, DHRM and not this Division should carry out such comparisons, concluded the trier of 
facts. The evidentiary trier essayed that aDHRM, it appears in this case, has established a 
policy of allowing equitable adjustment only to correct inequities within a classification. 
Agencies doing otherwise may be outside their scope of authority." (Step 5 Decision, p. 10.) 
The Board, however, has chosen to make a more reserved conclusion regarding whether 
employees on different salary ranges and with differing job titles (such as Engineers III and IV) 
in the same class series may compare their individual pay rates under the aegis of pay inequity 
claims or pay discrepancy grievances with other employees. The Board concludes that it is not 
necessary to reach such a conclusion, given the circumstances of this case. 
As the Paid case turns on the rational justification of salary market data and conditions, 
including an exceptionally long position vacancy rate, it is not necessary to decide at this time 
whether grievants with differing job titles (such as Engineers III and IV) may compare 
themselves with employees on other salary ranges as Mr. Patel has chosen to do. 
Notwithstanding, the burden of proof remains with the aggrieved employee or group of 
employees to compare their salary or pay rates with the appropriate job title and salary range 
in order to determine if an inequity exists in light of the Board's Conclusions of Law and 
discussion contained herein. 
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same job title are paid at 
the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not contemplate identical pay rates for similarly 
situated employees because variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in employees' 
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career mobility assignments, 
varying amounts of merit money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost 
of living adjustments (COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry rates (creating salary 
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings, 
reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job-related factors. In prior decisions we have 
noted some of these distinctions and reasons for differing pay rates between employees due in 
part to "the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring practices, its change in 
philosophies by different administrations and department executives, its rather persistent 
changing of personnel rules to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other 
germane reasons that need not be included herein." A. Paul Lund v. Division of Health Care 
Financing, 3 PRB 24, at 11 (1987). In that decision, the Board held that the several divisions 
within the same department might—for justifiable reasons, such as budgetary or business 
necessity—offer differing salary increases among employees of the several divisions or even 
within the same division but at different times during the fiscal year based upon allocation of 
funding and available budget. Salary application to given situations should be reviewed on the 
basis of existing rules, where applicable use of proper discretion, application of consistency, and 
availability of funding, among other relevant factors, {lbid.) 
Inasmuch as the State's compensation system has been set up by the Legislature to 
compare its "comparability of state salaries to wages and salaries paid by private enterprise and 
other public employment for similar work" (§67-19-12(4)(b)(ii)), it is not unreasonable to believe 
that some stresses and strains will result on occasion concerning salary comparisons between 
certain employees. That, however, is why this Board exists: to review and adjudicate those 
matters brought through the grievance procedure, including disputes and complaints anent salary 
and wages. 
Finally, while Mr. Patel may continue to feel that an unfairness exists regarding the 
higher pay rate offered to Kennington at the latter's hiring, Patel is not without certain 
advantages and benefits which he has accrued over his 9.5 years with the Division. Patel enjoys 
9.5 years of investment with the State's retirement program compared with Kennington's zero 
investment upon the latter's commencement with the State. Appellant's accrual rates for earning 
sick leave and annual leave are much more than Kennington's. In general, Patel has benefited 
from his participation in the State's health and welfare plans for nearly one decade while 
Kennington just began as a new employee in October 1990. The State's employer-paid health 
and welfare plans, including annual leave and sick leave, translate into a substantial monetary 
value which Patel has benefited from for nearly a decade compared with Kennington's lack of 
such past advantages. Importantly, Appellant also has an opportunity to reach a greater 
maximum salary rate due to being on a higher salary (grade) range as an Engineer IV. 
Kennington's salary progress will be restricted as an Engineer III before Patel's. In sum, while 
market conditions served to justify a higher starting salary for Kennington, which even exceeded 
Patel's pay rate as a long-term and higher level employee, there is a monetary off-set in that 
Patel has benefited by 9.5 years of steady State employment, progression of salary and 
promotion, participation in quite favorable health and welfare plans, and nearly a decade's 
accumulation and accrual of sick leave and annual leave, and such other benefits as eleven paid 
holidays per year not available in the private sector. 
VI. DECISION 
The appeal is denied. The evidentiary decision at Step 5 is affirmed. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. The 1991 General Session of the Utah Legislature enacted legislation which changed the 
Division of Environmental Health to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality effective 
July 1, 1991. Hence, the former Bureau of Water Pollution control then became the Division 
of Water Quality. See Utah Code Unannotated §§19-1-101 et seq. 
2. The Step 5 Decision states that the spread sheet was performed within the Bureau of Water 
Pollution Control on all Engineer Ills. However, the record is corrected to read that the spread 
sheet analysis on all Engineer Ills was at the Division level, not just the Bureau level. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R140-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannotated Section 67-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
Section 67-46b-14. 
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